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This thesis attempts to provide empirical evidence for the hotly debated relation-
ship between nancial development and economic performance using a variety of
time series and panel data methods. Also, it extends the previous nance-growth
literature by examining the role of democracy in the process. Three inter-related
studies form the work undertaken.
Chapter 2: In the rst of these the impact of nancial development on growth
is investigated for the case of China using a range of time-series techniques. The
results from this work - which spans almost ve decades from 1952 - uncover
a bi-directional causality between the country's output performance and its -
nancial development. Meanwhile, domestic nancial development failed to pro-
mote China's long-term economic performance over the period under investiga-
tion. These ndings are inconsistent with the previous studies of Hao (2006) and
Liang and Teng (2006). Here, the failure of nancial development to stimulating
the long-term growth is attributed to the issues of majority government ownership
and the high volume of non-performing loans in the domestic nancial system.
Chapter 3: The relationship between domestic nancial development and
economic growth has been on the agenda of growth economics for a long time.
Notwithstanding its hypothesized benets certain studies have uncovered evidence
of the detrimental eect of domestic nancial development for the long-term growth
prospects. Such ndings highlighted the importance of institutional conditions of
nancial development. With a panel of 171 countries worldwide over the period
1960 to 2014, this study presents an examination of the question of whether the
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existence of sound democratic institutions is necessary for nancial development
to stimulate economic growth in these countries. The baseline results show that
nancial sector development per se has the capacity of exerting a signicantly
positive impact on domestic economic growth. However, little evidence of any
signicant eect of democracy on growth is observed. Meanwhile, the results
suggest that the positive eect of nancial development on economic growth does
not require the condition of the existence of democratic institutions. The study
conjectures that, for policymakers, improving the domestic nancial system can
contribute growth, even in the absence of sound democratic institutions.
Chapter 4: This research provides a re-examination of the long-term eect
of nancial development on economic growth using annual data for 67 countries
from 1971 to 2007. Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and cross-sectionally
augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) models have been applied
to confront cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-country dependence. A
positive and signicant eect of nancial development on the long-run per capita
output is observed. Typically, such a benecial impact is largely driven by non-
democratic countries. Also, some evidence of a nonlinear eect of nancial devel-
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One of the most controversial and hotly heated topics in growth economics is the
relationship between nancial development and economic performance. From the
early 20th century, a burgeoning volume of theoretical literature emphasizes the
importance of the functions of nancial institutions and nancial markets in the
process of economic progress. (Schumpeter, 1912; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973;
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith 1991) In particular, it
is commonly regarded that a well-developed nancial sector contributes to the
long-term economic growth via facilitating transactions, mobilizing savings and
diversifying risk. However, such a theoretical expectation is never free from scep-
ticism. As witnessed in various nancial sectors worldwide, the pitfalls of the
nancial system, such as, excessive speculative activities and nancial resource
misallocation, inevitably shed a doubt on the expected growth-enhancing role of
nancial development. At the same time, it is worth noting that growth economists
have attempted to prove the existence of a benecial impact of the development
of nancial sector on economic progress since the 1990s. (King and Levine, 1993a,
b; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al, 2014) Despite these eorts, however, existing
empirics have failed to reach a complete consensus.
Given the continuing interest in academia and among policymakers, this thesis
investigates the well-known association between economic performance and nan-
cial development. Specically, it focuses on the eect of nancial development
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on growth in a single country setting (China) and in cross-country scenarios. By
and large, the originality of this thesis derives from the employment of sophisti-
cated wide range of time series methods and recently developed panel data models.
Clearly, such applications have important bearings on how to empirically estimate
the eect which nancial development exerts on the long-term economic perfor-
mance.
Chapter 2 explores the nancial-growth association in the current second largest
economy worldwide; China. Despite its rapid economic growth in last few decades,
mixed evidence is revealed on the relationship between local nancial development
and economic performance. Within the constraint of data availability, annual
statistics of the level of real output and the level of credit of nancial intermedi-
aries are collected over a relatively long time of period from 1952 to 2010. The
estimation strategy is based on the multi-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) and
vector error correction (VECM) frameworks. For the purposes of comparison, two
popular cointegration approaches, namely the Johansen maximum likelihood and
Pesaran autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models, have been utilised. Ac-
cording to the estimates, some evidence of a negative eect of China's domestic
nancial development on the country's long-run output level is revealed. Also, a
bi-directional causality between economic performance and local nancial devel-
opment is uncovered. Briey, it is suggested that China's nancial sector failed
to promote the nation's economic performance over the period from 1952 to 2010.
This result is believed to be caused by government major ownership of banks and
the high volume of non-performing loans in the domestic nancial system.
The ndings of Chapter 2 clearly indicate the uniqueness of China's socio-
economic conditions. One important aspect of these, which is often regarded as
absent in Chinese economy, is democracy. Noticeably, the impact of democracy
on economic performance has been on the recent agenda of growth economics.
However, the role of democracy has been largely ignored in the previous literature
on the nance-growth nexus.
13
In order to fulll this gap, Chapter 3 of this thesis investigates whether democ-
racy has an impact on the expected growth-enhancing role of nancial development
worldwide. An unbalanced panel dataset of 171 countries over the period 1960 to
2014 is constructed to investigate this further. Credit of nancial institutions to
private sector over GDP is selected as the measure of nancial development in
this chapter. Dierent indicators, including the Polity 2 score from the Polity IV
dataset and the newly-proposed index from Acemoglu et al. (2014), have been
employed as the measures of democracy. Furthermore, for the estimation strat-
egy, diverse estimators, such as, rst-dierence and system Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) estimators, are employed in the dynamic panel data model. In
particular, we highlight the issue of \too many instruments" when using the GMM
estimators in the nite sample after which the instrument count is restricted in
our estimation. Our baseline results suggest a signicant and positive eect of
nancial development on economic growth. By and large, a one percent increase
of nancial development indicator generally leads to a two percent increase of av-
erage output growth according to the system GMM estimation results. At the
same time, limited evidence of a signicant eect of democracy and the interac-
tion term between nancial development and democracy is observed. Overall, the
results suggest that the benecial eect of nancial development generally does
not require the condition of democracy and that nancial development per se has
the capacity of stimulating domestic economic growth.
Chapter 4 provides a re-examination on the relationship between nancial de-
velopment and long-term output performance by exploiting both the time series
and cross-section dimensions of the data. Given data availability, a balanced
dataset containing 67 countries from 1971 to 2007 is constructed. The usage
of annual data uncovers the potential dynamic relationship in the context of
nance-growth nexus. In the meantime, cross-country heterogeneity and error
cross-section dependence in macro panel data have received a lot of attention in
recent growth empirics. (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Pesaran, 2015) In order to
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confront these issues, our estimation strategy takes advantage of autoregressive dis-
tributed lag (ARDL) and cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed
lag (CS-ARDL) models. Based on the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation
results, the eect of the nancial development, measured by the ratio of private
credit of nancial institutions to GDP, on the long-term output performance is
found to be positive and signicant. According to the subsample (democratic and
non-democratic subsamples) estimates, the benecial eect of nancial develop-
ment is believed to be largely driven by the 29 non-democratic countries in the
sample. In addition, some evidence of a bell-shaped relationship between nan-
cial development and economic performance is uncovered in this chapter, which









Throughout economic history there is a continuing controversy on the relationship
between nancial development and output performance. By and large, a growing
body of literature has emphasized a positive role that nance plays in the modern
economy. Typically, a well-functional nancial system has the capacity to promote
economic growth through producing essential information, exerting sound corpo-
rate governance etc. (Beck et al., 2010) However, given the lasting inuence of
nancial instability and the nancial crisis, scepticism arises on the expected bene-
ts of nance. At the same time, a strand of studies paid attention to the causality
pattern between nancial development and economic performance; an issue of key
importance for policy. Nevertheless, a consensus on this causality has not been
forthcoming given the contradictory predictions of the \demand-following" and
the \supply-leading" hypotheses.
As the largest developing country nowadays, the rapid growth of China's econ-
omy provides a good opportunity to contribute to previous research on the rela-
tionship between nance and growth. With data covering the period 1952 to 2010,
this empirical study aims to investigate the long-term relationship and causality
pattern between China's nancial development and the country's real output. In
particular, we contribute to the existing literature by (1) examining a long period
in the history of the People's Republic of China; (2) partially resolving the po-
tential omitted variable bias by the introduction of two extra control variables in
the regression and (3) by taking advantage of both the autoregressive distributed
lag regression (ARDL) and the Johansen maximum likelihood approaches for the
detection of cointegrating relationships.
In general, the empirical evidence revealed in this study proves the existence of
a long-term relationship among China's real output, nancial development, capital
stock and trade openness. Meanwhile, a detrimental eect of domestic nancial de-
velopment on China's long-term output level is observed. A bi-directional causality
17
between economic performance and nancial development has also been identied
in China's case. Collectively, this chapter conjectures that China's nancial sys-
tem failed to promote the country's real output from 1952 to 2010. Typically,
the nding of the failure of the Chinese nancial sector in the nation's long-term
economic progress is not consistent with previous studies of Hao (2006) and Liang
and Teng (2006). In order to fulll the expected benecial eect of nancial de-
velopment in China, this study calls for the recognition of the necessity of further
reforms in the domestic nancial sector. Also, for policy makers, eorts should be
made on the identication of the binding constraints and on the determination of
the priorities of future reforms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature
review on the nance-growth relationship. Section 2.3 introduces the data used
and methodology applied. Section 2.4 shows the regression results with associated
analyses. Section 2.5 summarises and concludes the work.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Financial Development and Economic Performance
The investigation of the role of nancial development on economic growth is not
new. At the theoretical level, Smith (1776) suggested the eect of money in re-
ducing transaction costs. Hamilton (1781) wrote that \banks were the happi-
est engines that ever were invented" in economic progress. Schumpeter (1912)
stressed that the services of nancial intermediaries are crucial in the technolog-
ical innovation and economic growth. Meanwhile, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973) pointed that government interventions for nancial repression were likely
to restrict the nancial intermediaries from channeling nancial resources to pro-
ductive enterprises thus lowering economic performance. The endogenous growth
literature also focused on the various functions of nancial institutions and nan-
cial markets in capital accumulation and technological innovation. As summarized
18
by Levine (2005), nancial development could be dened as the improvements of
ve basic functions provided by the nancial system:
(1) Information Production
Both nancial institutions and nancial markets have an advantage in produc-
ing and collecting essential information on investment and economic activities at
a low cost. Such information could be used to identify the most promising in-
vestments, thus allocating resources in an ecient way. (Levine, 1997; Beck et al.
2010)
(2) Corporate Governance
The diculty of shareholders in monitoring the activities of managers could be
resolved by the nancial sector. With instruments like nancial arrangements and
publicly traded stocks, the overall cost of corporate governance could be reduced
while managers would have extra motivation to exert sound governance, thus pro-
moting resource allocating eciency, overall productivity and economic growth.
(Diamond, 1984; Beck and Levine, 2004)
(3) Risk Diversication
The nancial system has the ability to match a huge volume of loans with
diverse maturity periods which decreases the overall risk that individuals need to
face and investors are exposed to. In particular, a well-established nancial sector
is capable of diversifying the cross-sectional and inter-temporal risks in investment
projects. Consequently, as the nancial system develops, more investments can
be conducted under a relatively low risk level, which facilitate the research and
development activities and economic performance. (Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Allen and Gale, 1997)
(4) Savings Mobilization
With the advantages of lowering transaction costs, the nancial system has the
capacity of pooling the savings and diversifying them into dierent portfolios via
nancial arrangements, bilateral contracts for instance. New enterprises could have
access to credit with the support of nancial \mobilizers" which would encourage
19
activities of innovation and technological reform. As a result, the nancial system
is able to boost economic growth through the mobilization of savings. (Levine,
1997; Beck et al. 2010)
(5) Transaction Facilitating
Cost reduction provided by nancial sector contributes to the process of spe-
cialization, which is stressed by Adam Smith (1776) as a key element in the growth
of the economy. Also, individuals and enterprises could take advantages of nan-
cial arrangements to avoid diculties during evaluating investments and searching
for funds. Together, with a well-developed nancial system, innovation and tech-
nological reform can be motivated which promotes economic performance in the
long run. (Levine, 1997; Beck et al. 2010)
In general, according to Levine (2007), each of these functions is capable of ex-
erting impacts on the investment decisions and the eciency of nancial resources
allocation, thus promoting long-term output. As a result, if existing, the causal re-
lationship should be running from nancial development to economic performance.
Such a view is also referred to as the \supply-leading" hypothesis. However, some
argued that nancial sector passively responds to the new demand for nancial
service in the economy. In short, as stated by Robinson (1952), \where enterprise
leads nance follows". According to this \demand-following view, the causality is
from economic performance to nancial development.
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
The empirical examination on the eect of nancial development on growth started
from the 1960s. Findings of some key research on this nance-growth nexus are dis-
played in Table 2.1. Following Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine (1993a, b) rst
provided the evidence of positive conditional cross-country relationships between
nancial development and output growth. In particular, with a sample of around
80 nations, both papers conducted by King and Levine extended the standard






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































measures of nancial development as additional regressors. Inspired by King and
Levine (1993a, b), a burgeoning volume of empirical studies have emerged on the
importance of nancial development on economic performance from the 1990s to
the early 2000s. In particular, diverse econometric techniques have been applied
to analyze the eect on economic growth of nancial system development. For
instance, under the multi-variate vector autoregression (VAR) framework, Luintel
and Khan (1999) revealed a positive correlation and a bi-directional causality be-
tween nancial development and economic performance with the time-series data
of 10 nations from 1951 to 1995. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) and Abosedra
et al. (2015) also found bi-directional causality between economic performance and
nancial development in Egypt and Lebanon respectively. Meanwhile, Beck et al.
(2000), Levine et al. (2000), and Beck and Levine (2004) used the panel datasets
of both developed and developing countries for the post-1960 period. The exis-
tence of a signicantly positive relationship between output growth and nancial
development was found in these studies. With panel unit roots and cointegration
analyses, Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) argued that there is a uni-directional
causality which runs from nancial development to economic growth in 10 de-
veloped economies from 1970 to 2000. By and large, the majority of empirical
nance-growth literature before the recent global nancial crisis commonly sug-
gested that a well-developed nancial system has a positive, signicant and robust
eect on economic performance.
2.2.3 Scepticism on the Finance-Growth Relationship
Despite the theoretical and empirical evidence for a growth-enhancing role of -
nancial development, various scholars shared the sceptical view of Lucas (1988),
who stated that the inuence of the nancial sector in the process of economic
growth is overemphasized. To start with, many pointed out the potential detri-
mental eects of a nancial sector of an excessive size. Specically, recent evidence
suggested that a series of factors, including imperfect competition, rent extraction,
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and negative externalities from auxiliary nancial services, contribute to an over-
sized nancial system (Cahuc and Challe, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Arcand et al.,
2015). Such a nancial system could lead to excessive speculative activities, nan-
cial resource misallocation and economic instability without beneting long-term
economic performance. (Keynes, 1936; Kindleberger, 1978; Beck et al., 2014;
Cournede and Denk, 2015)
At the same time, a strand of literature highlighted instances of nancial crises,
which shed doubt on the previous ndings of a growth-enhancing role of nance.
Early studies, for example, Minsky (1982, 1991), contended that bank lending is
essentially central for economic activities and that the nancial sector is likely
to engage in excessive over-leveraged investment during the economic expansion
stage. However, such an engagement could lead to nancial instability and provide
incentives for enterprises to default on the loan repayments. The instability in the
nancial sector could then trigger a nancial crisis as the bankruptcies start, and
thus lead to the phase of economic recession. In the meantime, as witnessed in the
recent 2007- 2008 nancial crisis, the malfunctioning nancial sector is believed
to be capable of encouraging speculation, discouraging saving, and to misallocate
resources both directly and indirectly. As a consequence, many countries experi-
enced sharp employment declines and drastic output losses (Law and Singh, 2014;
Cournede and Denk, 2015) As stated by Rajan (2006), the further development of
nancial sector in the second half of the last century altered managerial incentives
leading to a preference for risky investments. A large and complicated nancial
sector is likely to end up in a \catastrophic meltdown" due to the changes in the
nature of risks undertaken in the nancial system. Also, nancial development is
itself also regarded as a precursor of crisis in some literature. (Kaminsky and Rein-
hart 1999; Wachtel, 2011; Schularick and Taylor 2012) Typically, after revisiting
fteen cases of severe nancial crises in the late last century, Reinhart and Rein-
hart (2010) found that countries suering these crises had commonly witnessed a
surge in the domestic bank credit to GDP ratio in the pre-crisis periods.
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2.2.4 Measures of Financial Development
Diverse indicators have been proposed to capture the level of development of -
nancial sector. However, most of these indicators are essentially measures of the
size of the nancial institutions, such as:
M1. Deposits of nancial intermediaries/ GDP
M2. Loans of nancial intermediaries/ GDP
M3. Credit of nancial intermediaries/ GDP
Such a phenomenon is partially based on the assumption that the quantity of
nancial sector is synonymous with the quality. However, the idea that larger is
better is no longer well embraced and the measure of the size of nancial sector only
captures one aspect of the overall development of the nancial system. (Wachtel,
2011; Arcand et al., 2015) In other words, these three indicators generally fail to
account for either eciency or access to nancial system.
Meanwhile, as argued by Abosedra et al. (2015), money stock is a reliable
measure of nancial intermediaries and money supply could be applied as a proxy
for nancial development, that is,
M4. Broad Money (M2)/ GDP
However, as monetisation can be increased without improvements in the -
nancial system, this ratio could be inappropriate especially for underdeveloped
economies. (Luintel and Khan, 1999)
Also, according to Ang and McKibbin (2007), commercial banks are more
ecient than central banks in providing basic nancial services. Another nancial
development measure is employed in the previous literature, that is:
M5. Bank credit/ (Bank credit + Central bank domestic assets)
Nevertheless, La Porta et al. (2002) highlighted the political inuence of gov-
ernments on commercial banks in the allocation of nancial resources in socialist
countries. Sahay et al. (2015) argued that the well-functioning of a large nancial
system could be limited if it is wasteful or not accessible to the large body of en-
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terprises. Considering commercial banks may only lend to the private enterprises
favoured by government or to the public sector under political inuence, questions
remain on this measure.
At the same time, recent nance-growth literature shared the tendency to use
the private credit ratio as a standard nancial development indicator, that is,
M6. Credit by nancial intermediaries to the private sectors/ GDP
The frequent usage of this nancial development ratio is largely due to the belief
that a nancial sector lending to private rms is more capable of promoting output
growth than one only oering credit to the government or state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). (Levine, 2005; Beck et al., 2010; Wachtel, 2011) Nonetheless, to some
extent, this private credit to GDP indicator is poor considering it may reect
economy wide leverage instead of capturing how much nance can accomplish its
basic functions in the economy. (Arcand et al., 2015; Sahay et al., 2015)
In addition, several other indicators have been adopted to proxy the level of
development of nancial markets, such as:
M7. Market capitalisation ratio (Market capitalisation/ GDP)
M8. Turnover ratio (Total value of shares traded/ Stock market capitalisation)
M9. Market volatility ratio1
However, listing shares does not necessarily foster resource allocation and the
market capitalisation ratio may fail to reect the development of nancial markets.
Also, it is doubtful if all funds raised from stock markets are actually used to nance
productive projects, considering merger and acquisition activities nowadays. (Beck
and Levin, 2004; Beck et al., 2010)
Clearly, every nancial development measure described earlier has its own pit-
falls. As Wachtel (2011) and Sahay et al. (2015) emphasized, given these indicators
remain available but imperfect, one should take the deciencies of a measure into
account when interpreting empirical results.
1For example, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) measured market volatility by a sixteen quarter
moving standard deviation of the end of quarter change of stock market prices.
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2.2.5 China's Financial System
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China's
nancial system has experienced a dramatic evolution and has become a crucial
component of the domestic economy. In general, before the \opening-up and
reform" policy adopted in 1978, People's Bank of China (PBC) was both the cen-
tral bank and the only commercial bank in China. With a series of reforms in
the domestic nancial sector, a nancial regulatory system has been constructed
since 2003: the central bank, i.e. PBC, is primarily in charge of monetary poli-
cies. Meanwhile, two institutions - the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC)2and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) - manage daily
activities of domestic nancial institutions and nancial markets, respectively.
Except for the regulatory authorities, nancial institutions in China consist
of 4399 legal entities of banking and non-banking nancial institutions with 409
million employees by the end of 2016 3. From Figure 2.1, both total deposits and
total loans in domestic nancial institutions have been enjoying stable growth since
the early 1990. Typically, according to the annual report of CBRC in 2016, the
outstanding balance of deposits and loans reached 155 trillion yuans (23.4 trillion
US dollars 4) and 112 trillion yuans (16.9 trillion US dollars), respectively.
One typical characteristic of China's nancial system is that the whole banking
sector is mainly composed of the ve large commercial banks 5, which were formerly
state-owned in the early 1980s. Since the early 21st century, a series of plans of
nancial reforms were adopted for the purpose of eciency improvement for the
domestic banking industry, including the process of partial privatization of the
\Big Five". However, as argued by Allen et al. (2012) and Elliott and Yan (2013),
2CBRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) have been further organized
as a single regulatory institution since April, 2018.
3Banking nancial institutions include policy banks, commercial banks, rural cooperative
banks, rural credit cooperatives, locally incorporated foreign banking institutions etc.; non-
banking nancial institutions include trust companies, nance companies of corporate groups,
nancial leasing companies, rural credit cooperatives etc.
4Average central parity rate of the RMB yuan against the US dollar was 6.64 approximately
in 2016.
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Figure 2.1: Changes of Nominal Deposits and Loans of Financial Institutions
the \Big Five" still have the capacity of providing nearly half of the loans of all
nancial institutions in China.
Another characteristic of the Chinese nancial sector is the lasting inuence
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and of local authorities on the decision-
making of nancial institutions. Firstly, a large proportion of domestic nancial
institutions are majority-owned by the state, or by the state-owned nancial en-
terprises. As a result, the appointment system of the executives of these nancial
institutions is comparable to the one for the government and the CCP ocials.
Allen et al. (2012) pointed out that the executives of these nancial institutions
could favour political benet when making crucial operational decisions. Secondly,
government intervention can be traced by the allocation of nancial resources. As
argued by Elliott and Yan (2013), China's nancial institutions are in favour of
channeling funds to the large SOEs instead of small private enterprises especially
in the second half of the 20st century. Such a phenomenon could be due to the fact
that large SOEs normally have held monopolistic power in various local industries,
5China Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and Com-
mercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC), and Bank of Communications (BCM).
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which ensures stable economic returns for nancial institutions. Also, banks may
even make loans to the non-protable and non-solvent SOEs under certain polit-
ical pressures. However, such a decision is not entirely against their institutional
interest. (Cull and Xu, 2003; Elliott and Yan, 2013)
Figure 2.2: Changes of Nominal Issued Volume of Government and Corporate
Bonds
In the meantime, nancial markets in China mainly consist of bond markets and
stock markets. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the largest
bond holders of China's bond market are nancial institutions. After releasing
a series of strict regulatory requirements for bond issuance in 2010, corporate
bonds enjoyed a rapid growth in issuance compared to the decreasing issuance of
government bonds which occurred at the same time (see Figure 2.2). However,
China's bond markets remain generally underdeveloped. By the end of 2016, the
aggregate value of bonds issued had reached 3.6 trillion yuans (0.55 trillion US
dollars). Meanwhile, both established in 1990s, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) and the Shenzen Stock Exchange (SZSE) together have been ranked as
the second largest stock market worldwide in 2016 with 3052 listed companies and
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an aggregate market value of 50.8 trillion yuans (7,65 trillion US dollars).
Several features of China's nancial markets could be highlighted here. Firstly,
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the largest bond holders of
China's bond markets are nancial institutions. To compare, the majority of in-
vestors in the stock markets are individual investors instead of institutions because
of the legal prohibition of market entrance. Secondly, investors in the stock market
focus on the short-term return of price dierentials instead of the long-term value
of stock growth. Such speculative investments have been criticized for decades,
given the potential damaging eect for domestic nancial markets. (Elliott and
Yan, 2013) Thirdly, the basic rights of shareholders are poorly protected in China's
stock markets, which limits voting power of shareholders on the major operational
issues of large listed companies. (Allen et al., 2012; Elliott and Yan, 2013)
2.2.6 Empirical Studies for China
A growing number of empirical studies have attempted to examine the nance-
growth nexus in China. In particular, a majority of scholars, such as, Liang and
Teng (2006) and Jalil and Ma (2008), have used measures of nancial institution
development - M1, M2 or M3 - to indicate overall nancial development in China.
On the one hand, the role of local nancial institutions is vital and irreplaceable
in providing nancial services in the history of the PRC (Liang and Teng, 2006);
on the other hand, such a strategy is essentially due to the availability of these
measures over a relatively long time period in China. In particular, China expe-
rienced a long period of political instability before the \opening-up and reform"
policy in 1978, during which the state departments failed to collect comprehensive
statistics concerning the development of the domestic nancial system.
Mixed empirical results have been observed on China's nance-growth rela-
tionship with diverse analytical techniques (See Table 2.2). To be specic, time
series studies by Liang and Teng (2006), Chen and Zhang (2008) and Jalil and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ment and economic growth. In particular, Liang and Teng (2006) also found a
uni-directional causality from China's economic progress to nancial development
over the period 1952 to 2001. However, Chen and Zhang (2008) did not observe
a clear causal relationship from 1952 to 2007. Under the panel data framework,
Hao (2006) and Cheng and Degryse (2010) suggested that the relationship be-
tween China's nancial development and economic growth is a positive one at the
regional level. However, others, including Boyreau-Debray (2003), Hasan et al.
(2009) and Zhang et al. (2012), found a negative eect of nancial development
on output performance in China.
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2.3 Methodology and Data
2.3.1 Model Identication
Early empirical studies, for instance, Arestis and Demetriades (1997), employed a
bi-variate framework in the investigation of the eect of nancial development on
output performance. However, as stressed by Caporale and Pittis (1995), ndings
based on the bi-variate method could be misleading considering the potential omit-
ted variable bias. For the purpose of avoiding erroneous inferences, a multi-variate
framework is employed in this study.
Following Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Christopoulos and Tsionas
(2004), this study uses the level of output, that is, real per capita gross domestic
product (GDP), as the measure of economic performance.6Apart from the nan-
cial development indicator, two control variables, namely, a measure of physical
capital stock and a measure of trade openness are included on the right-hand side
of the regression.
Under the condition of a constant technology, a log-linear Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is applied in this chapter:
GDPt = 0 + 1FinDevt + 2Investt + 3Tradet + ut (2.1)
where GDPt is the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP. FinDevt is the
natural logarithm of aggregate credit of nancial intermediaries to GDP. While
Investt and Tradet are natural logarithm of real per capita physical capital stock
to GDP and natural logarithm of sum of exports and imports to GDP. Summary
statistics are displayed in Table 2.3.
6 Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) argued that regressions using level of output as the left-
hand side variable should not strictly be treated as \growth" regressions. Here, the simplied
interpretation of real per capita GDP as \economic growth" is not accurate.
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Table 2.3: Data Description
Variable Max Min Mean St.Dev.
GDPt 8.401 4.772 6.156 1.034
FinDevt 2.051 -1.743 0.359 1.266
Investt 7.568 4.086 6.020 0.770
Tradet -0.428 -3.003 -1.783 0.798
Note: Statistics are for the variables after
the log transformations.
2.3.2 Data Sources
As stressed by Campbell and Perron (1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991), the
use of a suciently long sampling time is crucial for a time-series study. However,
expanding the time series by converting low-frequency data to high-frequency data
will not help enhance the power of unit root test, cointegration test or causality
test. Meanwhile, in China's case, the time span of the study is subject to data
constraints: rstly, the ocial records of macroeconomic statistics can only be
traced back to 1952; secondly, China's statistics department, the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS), made major changes on the data collecting and reporting
from 2010. Typically, the data published in the post-2010 period is not completely
comparable to that in the pre-2010 period. As a result, the time span for this
empirical study is from 1952 to 2010. In comparison, our sample size exceeds that
used in most of the former studies on the China's nance-growth nexus.
Diverse indicators of nancial development have been put into practice in the
previous empirical nance-growth literature. However, issue of data availability
has restricted our choices of nancial development measure. In detail, given the
ocial statistical collection of broad money started in 1990, indicator M4 is not
selected for this chapter. Likewise,M5 is not considered given that the information
on central bank assets can only be traced back to the 1990s. Besides, nancial
resources to the private sector is not well-documented in the history of the PRC
and thus M6 is abandoned. In addition, as China's stock markets only started in
1990, measures of nancial market development are also not employed due to a
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limited time period available.7As it is available for our sample period, indicatorM3
(Credit of of nancial intermediaries/ GDP) is selected as the measure of China's
domestic nancial development in this chapter.
Data constraints have also aected the selection of control variables for this
study. In general, China's ocial records of human capital, government spending
and other institutional variables are incomplete for the period 1952 to 2010, espe-
cially for the period before the implement of the \opening-up and reform" policy.
As we managed to collect series of physical capital stock and trade openness over
the sample period, these variables are employed as control variables. In particu-
lar, physical capital stock is normally assumed to greatly inuence in the economy
as demonstrated by both neoclassical and endogenous growth models (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Besides, as suggested by Liang and Teng (2006) and Jalil
and Ma (2008), both exports and imports have played a crucial part in stimulating
China's economy.
The data source for this empirical study mainly consists of two parts (see Table
2.4). One is the online NBS database which provides various macro level data,
e.g. population, nominal GDP, consumer price index (CPI), exports and imports.
The other one is the publications of NBS, including \Comprehensive Statistical
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (1949-1998)", \Statistical Yearbook
of China's Fixed Asset Investment (1952-1995)" and fourteen versions of \China
Statistical Yearbook" from year 1997 to year 2010. These ocial publications
jointly provide credible statistics of China's domestic nancial system.
Typically, all the series collected are in nominal terms initially except the series
of consumer price index (CPI) and population. Following Beck et al. (2000) and
Beck and Levine (2004), the GDP series is deated by the annual CPI. Also,
end-of-year nancial balance sheet items are deated by end-of-year CPI. Data of
7Other potential China's nancial development measures are also not used in this study.
These indicators are: sum of loans to township enterprises, enterprises with foreign funds, pri-
vate enterprises and self-employed individuals/ GDP, household savings deposited in nancial
intermediaries/ GDP) and share of xed asset investment nanced by domestic loans to that -
nanced by state budgetary appropriation. Typically, the availability of these three measures only
starts from 1981.
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aggregate capital stock of China is collected from Shan (2008) for period 1952 to
2006, and Lin and Du (2015) for period 2007 to 2010. As both papers applied the
perpetual inventory method in computing capital stock, further merging the data
is an appropriate process.
Table 2.4: Data Source
Category Time Period Source
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1952 - 2010 NBS Database etc.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1952 - 2010 NBS Database etc.
Population 1952 - 2010 NBS Database etc.
Credit of Financial Intermediaries 1952 - 2010 NBS Database etc.
Aggregate Capital Formation 1952 - 2010 Shan (2008), Lin & Du (2015)
Exports and Imports 1952 - 2010 NBS Database etc.
Notes: NBS Database website is: http://data.stats.gov.cn/. Other ocial publi-
cations used include \Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years
of New China (1949-1998)", \Statistical Yearbook of China's Fixed Asset Invest-
ment (1952-1995)" and \China Statistical Yearbook".
2.3.3 Methodological Framework
2.3.3.1 Unit Root Test
As is common for most macroeconomic time series, measures of real output, nan-
cial development and other variables described above are likely to be unit roots.
To examine whether a time series is stationary, two unit root tests, namely, aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Pillips-Perron test, are implemented in this
study. Nevertheless, it is highlighted by various scholars, e.g. Perron (1989, 1990)
among others, that results of stationarity generated by universal unit root tests
may be biased in the presence of unknown structural breaks. To identify whether
the series of interest is a unit root or a stationary process contaminated with a
structural break, the Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test is also applied. In par-
ticular, the Zivot-Andrews (1992) test does not include dummy variables to allow
for an exogenous structural break. Instead, it selects the break point where the
t-statistic testing the null hypothesis of a unit root is the most negative. Such a
procedure of Zivot-Andrews (1992) test is endogenous in essence as it allows for
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an unknown break point, which is determined endogenously from the data. (Lee
and Strazicich, 2003)
2.3.3.2 Pesaran ARDL Approach for Cointegration
Cointegration arises if a linear combination of several unit root processes results in
a stationary series. Allowing each variable in the system to have dierent number
of lag terms, the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach of Pesaran et al.
(1996, 2001) is considered to outperform other cointegration methods in several
aspects. Firstly, ARDL bound testing techniques can be established regardless of
whether the regressors in the system are I(0) or I(1). However, if a regressor is
an I(2) series, the ARDL bound testing technique is no longer suitable. Secondly,
simulation evidence of Pesaran and Shin (1998) suggested that the ARDL bound
testing approach has the capacity of generating consistent result for small size
samples. In order to detect the presence of cointegration, the rst-dierence form































































4iTradet i + 5GDPt 1 + 6FinDevt 1 + 7Investt 1 + 8Tradet 1
+9D4 + 4t
(2.5)
where  is the dierence operator. D1, D2, D3 and D4 are four dummies in
equations (2.2) to (2.5), respectively, accounting for structural breaks indicated
by the Zivot and Andrew (1992) test. 1t, 2t, 3t and 4t are normally distributed
independent error terms.
The ARDL bound testing procedure is based on the joint F-statistic through
the restrictions on the estimated coecients of one period lagged regressors to
zero. To be specic, in Eq. (2.2), the null hypothesis of no cointegration is (H0 :
5 = 6 = 7 = 8 = 0) against the alternative hypothesis (H1 : 5 6= 0; 6 6=
0; 7 6= 0; 8 6= 0). In Eq. (2.3), the null becomes (H0 : 5 = 6 = 7 = 8 = 0)
against the alternative (H1 : 5 6= 0; 6 6= 0; 7 6= 0; 8 6= 0). Meanwhile, the null
hypothesis is (H0 : 5 = 6 = 7 = 8 = 0) in Eq. (2.4) against the alternative
(H1 : 5 6= 0; 6 6= 0; 7 6= 0; 8 6= 0). Then, in Eq. (2.5), the null hypothesis of
no cointegration is (H0 : 5 = 6 = 7 = 8 = 0) against the alternative hypothesis
(H1 : 5 6= 0; 6 6= 0; 7 6= 0; 8 6= 0).
Pesaran et al. (2001) argued that the F-statistic is asymptotically non-standard
distributed under the null hypothesis and proposed two sets of critical bound val-
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ues. As stated by Pesaran et al. (2001), once the joint F-statistic exceeds upper
critical bounds (UCB) value, the null hypothesis of the no cointegration relation-
ship is rejected. On the contrary, if the computed test statistic is lower than lower
critical bounds (LCB) value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Meanwhile,
if the computed F-statistic falls in between UCB and LCB, the cointegration test
is inconclusive. Considering the sample investigated in this study is small (i.e. 59
years), critical bounds reported in Pesaran et al. (2001), which are based on the
large sample size, are not employed. Instead, critical bound values for the relatively
small sample size are collected from Narayan (2005) in the present study.
2.3.3.3 Johansen Maximum Likelihood Approach for
Cointegration
Following the procedure of the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen (1988),
the VAR model with optimal lag length of p is:
Xt = + A1Xt 1 +   + Ap 1Xt p + t (2.6)
where  is a 41 vector of constant drifts. Xt represents a 41 vector. t is also a
41 vector and every element should be a normally distributed independent error
term. If every element in Xt = (GDPt; F inDevt; Investt; T radet)
0 is a unit root
process in level and there is a cointegration relationship among them, the VAR
model above should be rewritten as:
Xt = +  (L)Xt p+1 +Xt 1 + t (2.7)
where  is the dierence operator and  (L) is the 44 matrix of coecients. Here,
the method to select appropriate lag length in a VAR model is through information
criteria, that is, to choose the optimal number of lags which minimizes the value
of the given information criterion like the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
According to Johansen (1988), the existence of a cointegration relationship
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relies on the number of distinct cointegrating vectors among variables. Then,
the maximal eigenvalue test and the trace test, which are initially proposed by
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1994), could be employed to examine
the existence, as well as the number, of the distinct cointegrating vectors in the
VAR system.
In general, the rank of the  matrix is equivalent to the number of its char-
acteristic roots that diers from zero. By identifying the exact rank of , it is
feasible to judge whether there exists a cointegration relationship among the four
time series. To be specic, if the rank of  equals zero, then the four variables
are not cointegrated. If the rank of  is full, the vector process is stationary.
Meanwhile, if the rank of , represented by r, is in the range between zero and
four, i.e. rank decient, then we have r long-run cointegrating relationships. Let
 = 0, we have the VECM given by
Xt = +  (L)Xt p+1 + (0Xt 1) + t (2.8)
where both  and  are matrices. The term 0Xt 1 can be interpreted as the
linear stationary relationship and rows of 0 stand for the distinct cointegrating
vectors. The matrix  is the vector of the error correction coecients, which
measures the adjustment speed towards long-run equilibrium. In particular, the
signicant elements in  suggest that the variables in the system revert to the
long-run relationship over some time periods.
2.3.3.4 Granger Causality Test
According to Granger (1963), if the information in the series x1t contributes in
the forecast of the series x2t, x1t is said to \cause" or Granger-cause x2t. Here,
the word \cause" is a misnomer in a sense, given the fact that it only stands for a
correlation between the current value of one variable and the past value of another.
It does not imply that the movements of x1t cause movements of x2t.
Following the case above, if four regressors GDPt, FinDevt, Investt, Tradet
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are all I(1) processes, the Granger causality test should be implemented in a rst-
dierenced VAR model in the case of an absence of a cointegration relationship:
Xt = +  (L)Xt p+1 + t (2.9)
However, if there exists a stationary long-run equilibrium relationship among four
unit roots, one can derive the VECM form:













































For example, the causality from FinDevt to GDPt is not only from the lagged
dynamic terms FinDevt given '12i is dierent from zero, but also comes from
the lagged cointegrating vector ECTt 1 if 1 diers from zero. In practice, three
causality tests can be performed: the rst one is the signicance test of the lagged
dynamic terms. The second one is the signicance test of the lagged cointegrating
vectors, which is equivalent to a weak exogeneity test. And the last one is the joint
signicance test of both the lagged dynamic terms and the lagged cointegrating
terms, which also refers to a strong exogeneity test. (Demetriades and Hussein,
1996; Narayan and Smyth, 2005)
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2.4 Regression Results
2.4.1 Unit Root Test Results
Two standard unit root tests, i.e. ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, are used to ex-
amine the integration properties of the four analysed variables. Results are shown
in Table 2.5. In general, both conventional tests indicate that GDPt, FinDevt,
Investt and Tradet are unit root processes and become stationary in their rst
dierences over the sample period.
Table 2.5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests (1952-2010)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test
Variables
Level Dierence
Intercept With Trend Intercept With Trend
GDPt 3.800 0.070 -5.455*** -6.246***
[1.000] [0.996] [0.000] [0.000]
FinDevt -0.685 -2.005 -4.473*** -4.421***
[0.842] [0.586] [0.001] [0.004]
Investt -0.698 -2.375 -3.604*** -3.544**
[0.839] [0.388] [0.009] [0.044]
Tradet -0.321 -2.375 -5.489*** -5.522***




Intercept With Trend Intercept With Trend
GDPt 8.013 0.712 -4.768*** -8.232***
[1.000] [1.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FinDevt -0.277 -1.501 -4.348*** -4.296***
[0.922] [0.818] [0.001] [0.006]
Investt -1.640 -2.645 -3.492** -3.445*
[0.456] [0.263] [0.012] [0.056]
Tradet -0.164 -2.051 -5.321*** -5.315***
[0.937] [0.562] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: P-values are in the brackets. *** signicant at 1%;
** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. Null hypothesis
under ADF or Phillips-Perron test is that the series is a unit
root.
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As mentioned earlier, conventional unit root tests do not account for the pres-
ence of a structural break in the time series. The non-rejections of two tests may
occur for a stationary process aected by breaks. Therefore, the Zivot-Andrews
(1992) unit root test with one structural break is adopted to conrm the ndings
of ADF and Phillips-Perron tests. From Table 2.6, all four variables are I(1)s in
levels and I(0)s in rst dierences. Clearly, three unit root tests used have reached
the same conclusion. In particular, the endogenous break points can be identied
in this table.8 GDPt has an endogenous time break in 1980, which is after the
implementation of \opening up and reform" policy in 1978. Meanwhile, FinDevt
has its break in 1986. Tracing history in China, a series of reforms were conducted
in the early 1980s and four major state-owned banks had nished their separations
from PBC successively by 1984.9
Table 2.6: Zivot-Andrews Structural Break Unit Root Test (1952-2010)
Variables
Level Dierence
T-Statistic Time Break T-Statistic Time Break
GDPt -3.072 1980 -7.724*** 1964
FinDevt -4.132 1986 -5.388** 1963
Investt -4.144 1988 -4.915* 1996





Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at
10%. Null hypothesis under Zivot-Andrews (1992) test is that the
series is a unit root with a structural break in intercept and trend.
8We do not impose any exogenous break points, such as, 1978 (the start of \opening-up
and reform" policy), 2008 (recent nancial crisis) etc., for each of the four series. Instead,
the endogenous breaks detected by Zivot-Andrews (1992) test are used in the following ARDL
cointegration analyses.
9These four banks are: Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China
Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
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2.4.2 ARDL Approach for Cointegration and Causality
Considering none of four analysed series is I(2), the ARDL bound testing can be
applied for the identication of potential cointegration relationship. In general,
each variable in the model acts as dependent variable in the calculation of F-
statistics, which then need to be compared against the critical values provided by
Narayan (2005). As the computed F-statistic is sensitive to the lag length selection,
AIC is used in the determination of the optimal lag length following Abosedra et
al. (2015).10The results of ARDL cointegration test are displayed in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: ARDL Cointegration Test
Bounds Testing to Cointegration
Dependent Variable Estimated Models F-Statistics
GDPt F(GDP/ FinDev, Invest, Trade) 5.008**
FinDevt F(FinDev/ GDP , Invest, Trade) 3.533
Investt F(Invest/ GDP , FinDev, Trade) 9.333***
Tradet F(Trade/ GDP , FinDev, Invest) 4.159*




Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
Critical values are collected from Narayan (2005). Null hypothesis
under bound testing is that no cointegration among the variables.
From Table 2.7, whenGDPt is selected as the dependent variable, the computed
F-statistic, 5.008, is greater than the UCB value of 4.623 at the 5% level for the
1952 2010 period. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected
here. Similarly, if choosing Investt as the left-hand side variable, the F-statistic,
9.333, also exceeds the UCB value. Also, when Tradet acts as the dependent vari-
able, the F-statistic, 9.333, also exceeds the UCB value at the 10% level. However,
the bound test suggests that when FinDevt is the dependent variable, the calcu-
lated F-statistic is lower than the UCB. Therefore, three cointegration vectors are
found once measures of output, capital stock and trade openness are treated as the
10The maximum lag length is set to 3 due to the nite sample size.
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left-hand side variables. Such ndings validate that there is a long-run relationship
between GDPt, FinDevt, Investt and Tradet in China's case.
Given the existence of the cointegration relationship among four variables in
the model, the long-term and short-term eects of FinDevt, Investt and Tradet
on GDPt could be estimated via the error correction form of the ARDL model.
The estimates are shown in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: ARDL Cointegration Analysis
Long Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
FinDev -0.343 -0.870 0.391
Invest 0.741*** 3.310 0.002
Trade 1.415** 2.450 0.018
Constant 4.792*** 3.740 0.001
Short Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
ECT -0.080* -1.796 0.079
GDP ( 1) 0.519*** 6.770 0.000
FinDev -0.286*** -6.270 0.000
Invest 0.998*** 12.060 0.000
Invest( 1) -0.804*** -8.600 0.000
Trade 0.014 0.330 0.746
Trade( 1) -0.114*** -2.570 0.014









Notes: Estimates based on the error correction
model with GDPt as the dependent variable.
***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
From Table 2.8, the long-run coecient of nancial development on China's
long-run output level is negative. However, such an eect is statistically insigni-
cant at the conventional signicance level. In comparison, capital stock and inter-
national trade are positively, and signicantly (at the 1% level), associated with
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long-term real per capita output. All other things being equal, a 1% increase of
capital stock enhances domestic output by over 0.74 percent. Also, a 1% inter-
national trade increase promotes real GDP by 1.42%. Meanwhile, the short-run
results are reported in the middle segment of Table 2.8. In particular, the estimate
of the error correction term, ECT , is statistically signicant with a negative sign.
The short-term deviation from the long-term equilibrium relationship is corrected
at the rate of eight percent each year. Such ndings essentially validate the estab-
lished long-term relationship between GDPt, FinDevt, Investt and Tradet over
the sample period. Also from the middle segment, the short term eect of nancial
development on domestic output level is negative and signicant at the 1% level.
The results of diagnostic tests are detailed at the bottom of Table 2.8. In par-
ticular, the error term is normally distributed and free from the issues of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity. A well-specied functional form is ensured by
passing the Ramsey RESET test. In addition, to examine the constancy in the
parameters, the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) test and the cu-
mulative sum of recursive residuals of square (CUSUMSQ) test are adopted. From
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, the stability of the ARDL parameters can be ensured as
graphs of two tests are located within critical bounds at the 5% signicance level.
Figure 2.3: CUSUM Plot Figure 2.4: CUSUMSQ Plot
With the establishment of the long-term relationship in the model, three Granger
causality tests can be conducted under the error correction mechanism (ECM).
First is the short-term causality test. The signicance of the short-run causal
eects can be implied via the F-statistics on the lagged explanatory variables.
Second is the long-term causality test. The signicance of the long-run causal
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eects can be indicated by the T- statistics on the coecients of the lagged error-
correction term. Third is the joint causality tests. The signicance of both the
short-run and long-run causal eect is indicated by the F-statistics on both lagged
explanatory variables and the lagged error-correction term. (Narayan and Smyth,
2005) Table 2.9 displays the results.
Table 2.9: Granger Causality Analysis I
LHS Variable
Short Run Long Run Joint
GDP FinDev ECT GDP , ECT FinDev, ECT
GDP | 39.270*** -1.796* | 22.540***
[0.000] [0.079] [0.000]
FinDev 11.610*** | | | |
[0.000]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. T-statistics are
reported for long-run Granger causality tests. F-statistics are shown for the short-run
and the joint causality tests. P-values are in the brackets.
From the rst row of Table 2.9, the F-statistic, 39.27, on the FinDev indi-
cates a signicant short-term causal eect when GDP acts as the left-hand side
variable under the ECM. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no short-run causality
from China's nancial development to economic performance is rejected. Mean-
while, the T-statistic, -1.796, on the ECT suggests a signicant, albeit relatively
weak, long-term causal eect. Accordingly, the null of no long-term causality from
nancial development to output performance is also rejected. In addition, the
F-statistic, 22.54, also implies a joint causality running from domestic nancial
development to economic performance in Chinas case. From the second row of
Table 2.9, if FinDev is the left-hand side variable, the F-statistic, 11.61, on the
GDP indicates a signicant short-term causal eect. The null of no short-run
causality from China's economic performance to nancial development is rejected.
At the same time, the ECT is not included in the long-term causality test because
the variables are not cointegrated when FinDev is regarded as the left-hand
side variable. Collectively, we observe a bi-directional causality between China's
economic performance and the country's nancial system development over the
period 1952 to 2010.
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2.4.3 Johansen Maximum Likelihood Approach for
Cointegration and Causality
Considering that all the regressors in the system are unit root processes in levels,
it is feasible to conduct the Johansen cointegrating test to detect the long-run
relationship among the level of real output, nancial development, capital stock
and international trade. Here, the optimal lag length for the VAR is selected by
the AIC with maximum lag of 3 allowed for each variable. According to AIC, lag
2 is appropriate in the VAR system. Meanwhile, for the purpose of identifying
the number of distinct cointegration equations (CEs), the trace test is applied.
Table 2.10 shows the trace test results. From Table 2.11, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration relationships among variables is rejected at the 5% signicance level.
However, the null of at most one cointegration equation is accepted and therefore
a unique cointegration relationship among the four analysed variables is identied.
Table 2.10: Johansen Cointegration Test
Variable List
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
CE(s)
r = 0 r  1 r  2 r  3
GDPt, FinDevt, 50.669** 23.352 9.698 1.297 1
Investt, Tradet [0.027] [0.229] [0.305] [0.255]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and
10%. Optimal lag length is determined by AIC with allowance
of maximum lags of 3. Trace statistics are reported. P-values
are in the brackets. Null hypothesis is that there is at most r
cointegration equations in the system.
After conrming the number of CEs, the cointegrating relationship can be
established in the VECM form. The results are displayed in Table 2.11. From the
upper segment of Table 2.11, the long-term eect of nancial development on real
output is negative and statistically signicant, albeit at the relatively weak 10%
level. By and large, a 1% increase of nancial development measure is associated
with a 0.26% decrease of the level of average output. To compare, the long-term
eects of both capital stock and international trade on economic performance
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are signicant and positive. Typically, the estimated coecients are generally
similar with the ones generated by the ARDL cointegration method: a 0.71%
increase in real per capita GDP is boosted by a 1% increase in the capital stock
and a 1.34% increase in real average output is stimulated by a 1% increase in
trade openness. Meanwhile, from the middle segment of Table 2.11, the negative
and signicant estimated coecient on the ECT corroborates the existence of
the long-term relationship between four variables in the model. The short-run
deviation away from the long-run equilibrium can be corrected at a rate of 7.8%
each year. Also, it is evident here that the short-term impacts of China's nancial
development on economic performance are negative over the sample period.
Table 2.11: Johansen Cointegration Analysis
Long Run Results
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
FinDev -0.263* -1.780 0.075
Invest 0.712*** 4.960 0.000
Trade 1.337*** 6.660 0.000
Constant 5.183
Short Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
ECT -0.078** -2.012 0.044
GDP ( 1) 0.428 1.600 0.110
GDP ( 2) -0.256 -1.210 0.226
FinDev( 1) -0.027 -0.210 0.835
FinDev( 2) -0.208** -2.000 0.045
Invest( 1) 0.105 0.310 0.754
Invest( 2) -0.143 -0.460 0.644
Trade( 1) 0.040 0.500 0.619
Trade( 2) -0.211** -2.170 0.030




Notes: Estimates based on the error correction
model with GDPt as the dependent variable.
***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
Granger causality tests can then be performed under the VECM. From the
rst row of Table 2.12, the T-statistic, -2.012, on the ECT suggests a signicant
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long-term causal eect. Accordingly, the null of no long-term causality from -
nancial development to the average output level is rejected. Also from this row,
we observe some weak evidence of short-run and joint causal eects from China's
nancial development to economic performance over the sample period. Mean-
while, from the second row, the F-statistic, 9.97, on GDP indicates signicant
short-term causality from output performance to nancial development. Such a
causality pattern is also indicated by the joint causality test when FinDev is
the left-hand side variable. Therefore, a bi-directional causality between China's
economic performance and the country's nancial development from 1952 to 2010
is conrmed.
Table 2.12: Granger Causality Analysis II
LHS Variable
Short Run Long Run Joint
GDP FinDev ECT GDP , ECT FinDev, ECT
GDP | 5.070* -2.012** | 6.490*
[0.079] [0.044] [0.092]
FinDev 9.970*** | 0.300 14.510*** |
[0.007] [0.585] [0.002]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. T-statistics are
reported for long-run Granger causality tests. F-statistics are shown for the short-
run and the joint causality tests. P-values are in the brackets.
2.4.4 Robustness Check
To verify the ndings observed earlier, an alternative nancial development mea-
sure (FinDev2); that is, indicator M2 (Loans of nancial intermediaries/GDP),
is employed in the robust check. Detailed results of cointegration and Granger
causality tests can be found from the Table A2.1 to Table A2.6 in the appendix.
In essence, the existence of cointegration is, again, observed among real output,
nancial development, capital stock and trade openness under both ARDL and
Johansen maximum likelihood approaches. Similar to what has been suggested in
previous sections, a bi-directional causality is indicated between China's economic
performance and nancial system development over the period 1952 to 2010.
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2.4.5 An Analysis of the Results
In the preceding section, we conducted an empirical examination on the relation-
ship between nancial development and the level of real output in China over
the period 1952 to 2010. By and large, two major points emerged from the re-
gression results earlier. Firstly, the existence of the long-run equilibrium among
average output, capital stock, international trade and nancial development is re-
vealed by using both the ARDL and Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration
approaches. In particular, we found some evidence suggesting that the eect of
domestic nancial development on long-term real output is statistically signicant
and negative. However, in other cases, such an eect is insignicant. Secondly, a
bi-directional causality between China's real output and the country's nancial de-
velopment is observed in the sample period. Collectively, China's nancial system
development failed to promote the long-term economic performance from 1952 to
2010. This nding is generally in favour of the \demand-following" hypothesis and
is in line with previous China's studies, such as, Boyreau-Debray (2003), Hasan et
al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2012)
Two reasons can be listed here to explain the failure of local nancial institu-
tions on promoting real output in China. One is the political inuence on the credit
distribution of nancial institutions. In particular, domestic banks, which are pre-
dominantly state-owned banks, generally follow the \political pecking order" in
the allocation of nancial resources. To be specic, China's private enterprises do
not rank as high as the SOEs in terms of political status. Despite being ecient
and productive, private rms are often disadvantaged in acquiring loans from the
domestic nancial sector. To compare, under political pressure, local SOEs, even
the loss-making and inecient ones, could be favoured and supported by large
banks with cheap loans. (Liang and Teng, 2006; Poncet et al, 2010; Zhang et al.,
2012) The historical records of the allocation of nancial resources to SOEs and
to private rms remain unavailable. However, Brandt and Zhu (2000) estimated
that nearly 85% of newly issued credit from domestic banks was distributed to
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SOEs over the period 1979 to 1993. Also, as suggested by Poncet et al. (2010),
the phenomenon of \political pecking order" in the allocation of bank credit was
only alleviated from the late 1990s.
The other reason is the high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the
nancial system. In particular, historical data on the NPLs is still not available
from individual banks, which is referred to a strategic disclosure decision of the
Chinese authorities by Allen et al. (2012). Nevertheless, in a study by Qiu et al.
(2000), over a half of aggregate loans in the entire banking sector are estimated
to be NPLs in the 1990s. Typically, incentives of nancial institutions in the
identication of the high-quality borrowers are not enhanced by the government
ownership. Any old NPLs, which were largely generated due to the ineciency of
SOEs, can always be covered up by domestic authorities. (Hao, 2006; Liang and
Teng, 2006; Liang et al., 2013)
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to examine the controversial nance-growth nexus in
China. Using a variety of time series techniques, empirical evidence suggests the
existence of a long-term relationship among China's real output, nancial develop-
ment, capital stock and international trade. At the same time, some evidence of a
detrimental eect of domestic nancial development on China's long-term output
level is revealed. Also, a bi-directional causality between China's economic per-
formance and nancial development has been identied. Collectively, this study
conjectures that China's nancial system failed to promote the country's real out-
put from 1952 to 2010. The nding of the failure of Chinese nancial sector in
the nation's long-term economic progress is consistent with some existing studies,
such as, Boyreau-Debray (2003), Hasan et al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2012), but
against the arguments from Hao (2006) or Liang and Teng (2006).
In general, the work here highlights the necessity of the reforms on the domestic
nancial sector in the fulllment of its expected growth-enhancing role in China.
Firstly, as suggested by Allen et al. (2012) and Lin and Zhang (2009), state
ownership is negatively related to bank performance in terms of eciency and
protability. Therefore, the ongoing reforms on the domestic bank ownership,
such as, privatization of nancial institution, foreign acquisition and public listing
of large state-owned banks, should continue to be pushed forward. (Berger et
al, 2010; Allen et al., 2012; Elliott and Yan, 2013) Secondly, in a study of Liang
et al. (2013), the stock of NPLs in the Chinese banking system is positively
correlated with the degree of political connections of the bank directors. Clearly,
a market-oriented banking sector under the sound corporate governance is needed
to limit the expansion of NPLs. Thirdly, policy eorts are needed in the removal
of the credit constraints for private Chinese enterprises. As the private rms
have beneted from the foreign nancial resources, further liberalization of foreign
capital into Chinese nancial system should be encouraged. (Poncet et al, 2010)
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Also, this chapter emphasizes the identication of the binding constraints on
China's nancial sector. Typically, a series of reforms on domestic nancial sys-
tem have been implemented since the early 1990s. However, in a study of bank
performance over the period 1997 to 2004, Lin and Zhang (2009) found that do-
mestic banks which undergo a foreign acquisition or public listing failed to en-
joy improved eciency and protability after the ownership reform. This nding
highlights the \growth diagnostics" approach of Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco
(2008), which argues that not well-focused reforms may not contribute to eco-
nomic growth. Specically, according to Hausmann et al. (2008), governments are
incapable of implementing a long list of reforms with the intention of removing
all constraints at the same time due to limited resources. Therefore, this \growth
diagnostics" method argues that eorts should be made in the identication of a
small number of binding constraints, in the sense that their removal would have a
large impact on growth. (Hausmann et al., 2008; Rodrik, 2008) In the spirit of this
approach, our nding of a negative growth eect of China's nancial sector may
not only reect the lack of policy reforms but also may indicate the ineectiveness
of ongoing all-round reforms. As a result, this chapter calls for the focus on the
identication of the binding constraints and on the determination of the priori-




Table A2.1: ARDL Cointegration Test: Robustness Check
Bounds Testing to Cointegration
Dependent Variable Estimated Models F-Statistics
GDPt F(GDP / FinDev2, Invest, Trade) 5.319**
FinDev2t F(FinDev2 / GDP , Invest, Trade) 2.607
Investt F(Invest / GDP , FinDev2, Trade) 8.964***
Tradet F(Trade / GDP , FinDev2, Invest) 3.473




Notes: FinDev2 is proved to be a I(1) series in level using ADF, Phillips-
Perron and Zivot-Andrews tests. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at
5%; * signicant at 10%. Critical values are collected from Narayan
(2005). Null hypothesis under bound testing is that no cointegration
among the variables.
Table A2.2: Johansen Cointegration Test: Robustness Check
Variable List
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
CE(s)
r = 0 r  1 r  2 r  3
GDPt, FinDev2t, 51.143** 24.838 9.806 0.813 1
Investt, Tradet [0.024] [0.167] [0.296] [0.367]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and
10%. Optimal lag length is determined by AIC with allowance
of maximum lags of 3. Trace statistics are reported. P-values
are in the brackets. Null hypothesis is that there is at most r
cointegration equations in the system.
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Table A2.3: ARDL Cointegration Analysis: Robustness Check
Long Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
FinDev2 -0.282 -1.01 0.319
Invest 0.714*** 4.330 0.000
Trade 1.224*** 3.450 0.001
Constant 4.433*** 4.360 0.000
Short Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
ECT -0.091** -2.660 0.011
GDP ( 1) 0.533*** 7.240 0.000
FinDev2 -0.275*** -6.610 0.000
Invest 1.002*** 12.390 0.000
Invest( 1) -0.792*** -8.750 0.000
Trade 0.008 0.200 0.845
Trade( 1) -0.118*** -2.730 0.009









Notes: Estimates based on the error correction
model with GDPt as the dependent variable.
***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
Table A2.4: Granger Causality Analysis I: Robustness Check
LHS Variable
Short Run Long Run Joint
GDP FinDev2 ECT GDP , ECT FinDev2, ECT
GDP | 43.630*** -2.660** | 24.890***
[0.000] [0.011] [0.000]
FinDev2 12.410*** | | | |
[0.000]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. T-statistics are reported
for long-run Granger causality tests. F-statistics are shown for the short-run and the
joint causality tests. P-values are in the brackets.
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Table A2.5: Johansen Cointegration Analysis: Robustness Check
Long Run Results
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
FinDev2 -0.254* -1.780 0.075
Invest 0.705*** 5.320 0.000
Trade 1.223*** 7.240 0.000
Constant 4.768
Short Run Coecients
Variable Coecient T-Statistic P-Value
ECT -0.083** -2.000 0.045
GDP ( 1) 0.410 1.520 0.129
GDP ( 2) -0.255 -1.180 0.239
FinDev2( 1) -0.025 -0.200 0.844
FinDev2( 2) -0.224** -2.180 0.029
Invest( 1) 0.109 0.320 0.748
Invest( 2) -0.132 -0.420 0.675
Trade( 1) 0.047 0.590 0.552
Trade( 2) -0.210** -2.170 0.030




Notes: Estimates based on the error correction
model with GDPt as the dependent variable. ***,
** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table A2.6: Granger Causality Analysis II: Robustness Check
LHS Variable
Short Run Long Run Joint
GDP FinDev2 ECT GDP , ECT FinDev2, ECT
GDP | 6.360** -2.000** | 7.580*
[0.042] [0.045] [0.056]
FinDev2 9.050** | 0.190 12.370*** |
[0.011] [0.665] [0.006]
Notes: ***, ** and * are signicance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. T-statistics are
reported for long-run Granger causality tests. F-statistics are shown for the short-run








As a long-standing question in growth economics, the relationship between eco-
nomic performance and nancial development remains controversial. As argued by
a large body of literature, such as, Levine et al. (2000), Levine (2005), Beck et al.
(2010), and Greenwood et al. (2013), nancial development has played a crucial
role in the process of stimulating sustainable growth. However, notwithstanding
its hypothesized benets, certain empirics have uncovered evidence of the detri-
mental eect of domestic nancial development for long-term growth prospects.
Menyah et al. (2014) observed that nancial system development failed to promote
domestic output growth in Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo and
Sudan. Furthermore, Omri et al. (2015) found evidence of a negative eect of
nancial sector development on output growth in Egypt, Iran, Oman and Syria.
Similarly, in the preceding chapter of this thesis, the evidence presented suggested
that China's nancial development did not exert a positive impact on the nation's
economic performance. Noticeably, the countries mentioned above commonly lack
democracy in the domestic economy. Recent growth literature, such as Acemoglu
et al. (2014), and Madsen et al. (2015), has highlighted democracy to be a major
driver of economic growth. However, prior studies have largely ignored the role of
democracy in the nance-growth nexus.
In this chapter, we extend previous research by examining the impact of demo-
cratic institutions on the relationship between nancial development and economic
growth. Three contributions have been made to the existing literature. First,
this study specically examines the interaction between nancial development and
democracy to test the hypothesis that democracy is potentially a key condition
which compounds the growth-eect of nancial development. Second, this chapter
assembles a large panel for 171 economies spanning 55 years over the period 1960
to 2014. Dierent indicators of nancial development are constructed alongside
both standard and newly introduced measures of democracy. Using historical data,
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we are able to identify the impact on output growth through the interaction term
between democracy and nancial development. The third contribution is on the
variety of the estimation methods in the identication of the eects of nancial
development, democracy and the interaction between the two. Typically, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), Within Group (WG), dierenced GMM and system-GMM
estimators have been employed for the linear dynamic panel data model. Also,
GMM estimators are prone to the problems associated with instrument prolifera-
tion and this issue is addressed in the chapter.
The baseline results show that nancial development per se is capable of exert-
ing a signicant and positive impact on domestic economic growth. Such a nding
is in line with classic nance-growth empirical studies such as those of Beck et al.
(2000) and Beck and Levine (2004). According to the system GMM estimation,
a one percent increase of the ratio of private sector credit to GDP leads to a two
percent increase of the rate of growth of per capita GDP. Meanwhile, limited ev-
idence of a signicant impact on output growth of democracy, or the interaction
term between nancial development and democracy, is observed in the analysis. In
general, the nding of an insignicant eect of democracy on output growth is also
consistent with previous literature; for instance, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014). As
a result, the paper conjectures that the benecial eect of nancial development
on economic performance generally does not require the condition of the existence
of democracy. For policymakers, improving the domestic nancial system can
contribute growth, even in the absence of sound democratic institutions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between democracy and
growth. Section 3.3 outlines the modelling strategies, data and the empirical model
used for this study. Section 3.4 is the methodology section, with the empirical
results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 The Ambiguous Eect of Democracy on Growth
Theoretical research on the impact of a political system on economic growth has
been ongoing for decades. However, the issue concerning whether democracy di-
rectly exhibits a positive, or a negative, eect on economic growth remains contro-
versial among political science and economics scholars. Generally speaking, three
diverse opinions on the inuence of the democratic system on growth have been
put forward.1
a. Conict School
The conict school states that democracy hinders economic performance in
essence. (Lindblom, 1977; Schumpeter, 1942) Initially, a democratic state is often
characterized by universal surage. However, it is very likely that median voters
are an economically disadvantaged group, given the spread of voting rights in so-
ciety. In particular, these low income voters are believed to have a strong demand
for immediate consumption and a tendency to use political rights to fulll such a
demand by inuencing the process of policy-making. To fulll requests of immedi-
ate consumption, democratic states may be forced to lower income tax rates, raise
wages and adopt redistribution policies at the expense of protability of potential
investment. Inevitably, democratic states would face an inecient resource allo-
cation, a low investment level and, hence, a retarded rate of output growth in the
long run. (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Helliwell, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994)
On the contrary, it is believed that autocratic states are capable of resisting
immediate consumption demands and prohibiting potential dysfunctional conse-
quences in the decision-making procedure through the implementation of policies
suppressing individual incomes or labor unions (Huntington, 1987; Przeworski
and Limongi, 1993; Olson, 1993, 2000). At the cost of economic and political free-
1A literature review of the relationship between economic performance and nancial develop-
ment can be found in Chapter 2.
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dom, such strong policies in a dictatorship are believed to be necessary for rapid
growth, especially for developing nations. Also, with a low discount factor given
secure tenure, it is likely that autocratic rulers outperform democratic ones in
smoothing resource allocation, stimulating investment and, eventually, promoting
long-term economic growth (Moore, 1966; Huntington, 1987; Sirowy and Inkles,
1990; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993).
b. Compatibility School
The second perspective, the compatibility school, emphasizes the positive role
that the democratic system plays in economic performance (Przeworski and Limongi,
1993; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Benabou, 1996). Initially, the process of
policy-making is commonly discretionary in autocracy regimes. In the absence
of any sound supervision, kleptocratic dictators have the capacity of establishing
arbitrary policies aligned to the interests of a small proportion of elites in society.
In contrast, decision-making processes in democratic states are normally sub-
ject to strong public checks which essentially prevent attempts at monopolizing
lucrative economic opportunities (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2013). Besides, with advantages in protecting the private sphere, ensuring socioe-
conomic rights, encouraging market competition, limiting state intervention etc.,
a democratic political system is best suited for underdeveloped countries pursuing
sustainable growth (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Acemoglu et al.,
2014). In addition, although democratic redistribution under popular demand is
potentially distortionary, it is hard to ignore the fact that such redistribution could
be benecial for long-run economic performance if conducted in the form of public
goods or education. (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2014)
c. Sceptical Perspective
The sceptical perspective believes that there is not a systematic connection
between democracy and growth. In particular, as argued by Barro (1997), democ-
racy is not the key to economic growth. At the same time, proponents of this
perspective argued that because countries with diverse political systems can adopt
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the same economic policies, it seems pointless to merely focus on the inuence of
a specic political system on economic performance. As a result, more attention
should be directed to the typical institutional structures, as well as to development
strategies chosen by the government. (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990; Feng, 1997)
3.2.2 Democracy and Growth: Channels
Various political and social scientists have proposed that, other than its ambiguous
direct eect on growth, democracy is potentially capable of exerting a signicant
eect of long-term economic performance indirectly through diverse channels. In
particular, it is worth noting that the ignorance of the potential indirect mecha-
nisms could result in erroneous arguments on the democracy-growth relationship.
(Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Baum and Lake, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2014)
Physical Capital Investment
A connection between democracy and physical capital investment is widely sug-
gested given democracies have advantages in protecting property rights, ensuring
economic rights, and improving contract enforcement. (Przeworski and Limongi,
1993; Helliwell, 1994; Tavares and Wacziarg; 2001) Such advantages are believed
to exert a positive inuence on the increasing rate of return to physical capital and
to contribute to a higher rate of growth of output in the long run. However, due
to the pressure of immediate consumption, democracies have tendencies to narrow
income inequality through a series of redistributive policies, which could generate
a low level of return to capital and discourage future investment activities. As a
result, the overall eect of democracy on physical capital investment is theoreti-
cally controversial. (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Helliwell, 1994; Tavares and
Wacziarg; 2001)
Human Capital
A large number of authors have pointed out the connection between democracy
and human capital is bi-directional. Human capital is considered as a crucial pre-
condition in the process of democratization. At the same time, it is expected that
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public demand for education and health would be largely satised once a demo-
cratic political system is achieved. With more resources and stronger incentives
for pursuing a higher level of human capital, democratic states are believed to
perform better than autocratic ones in providing public health services, extending
life expectancy, and improving schooling attainments etc. Given the positive ef-
fect of human capital on economic growth, as suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992),
a democratic political system is capable of stimulating long-term output growth
through human capital. (Helliwell, 1994; Baum and Lake, 2003; Gerring et al.;
2005)
Government Size
It is theoretically controversial whether a democracy or an autocracy is accom-
panied with greater government size. In fact, both political systems have incentives
to expand their public expenditures. With more voices for the poor, democracies
could be required to increase size and sphere. Meanwhile, autocracies have natural
motivations to expand their activities for the maximization of economic resources
under control. (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001)
Trade Openness
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) argued that the extent of trade openness is gen-
erally aected by the degree of political freedom in society. Typically, democratic
states share the tendencies to pursue the interests of domestic consumers and, as a
result, to abandon popular protectionist policies in the autocracies. Nonetheless,
the policy-making process of democratic governments on international trade could
be manifested by a few beneting from protectionism through lobbying and voting.
Consequentially, it is unclear if a democracy performs better than an autocracy in
promoting trade openness on the theoretical level.
Other Channels
Apart from the three mechanisms mentioned above, various studies proposed
other potential channels through which democracy could potentially exert an im-
pact on economic performance. Such channels include: income inequality (Prze-
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worski and Limongi, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994;
Gerring et al.; 2005), political instability (Feng, 1997; Tavares andWacziarg, 2001),
quality of governance (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2013), union membership and welfare expenditure (Pougerami,
1988), scal balance, trade balance, money supply, wages, employment, foreign
investment, ination (Gasiorowski, 2000), social unrest (Gasiorowski, 2000; Ace-
moglu et al., 2014), population (Przeworkski et al., 2001; Grundler and Krieger,
2015b), total factor productivity, economic reforms and taxation (Acemoglu et al.,
2014).
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence
At the empirical level, it is dicult nowadays to reach a consensus of the direct
eect of democracy on economic performance. A summary of selected empirical
literature can be found in Table A3.1.
Taking advantage of the Freedom House dataset, Barro (1996) investigated the
impact of democracy on economic performance for a sample of 100 countries over
the period 1960 to 1990. The direct eect of democracy on economic growth was
shown to be negative, but statistically insignicant. Barro (1996) also examined
potential indirect channels of democracy on economic growth and suggested that
the overall eect of democracy is negative.
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) also examined potential eects of democracy on
output growth in a cross-country framework. Using a three stage least squares
technique in the identication of statistically feasible indirect channels of democ-
racy, it was revealed that democracy slows economic growth via low physical capital
accumulation and high government consumption. At the same time, democracy
stimulates growth via high human capital accumulation and high income equality.
However, the nding of overall eect of democracy on growth is negative.
Persson and Tabellini (2008) employed alternative democracy measures from
Polity IV and applied propensity scores methods in their cross-country study. With
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a large sample of 138 nations covering the period 1960 to 2000, they suggested a
positive impact on economic performance if a country moves from dictatorship to
democracy, a result which diered from the conclusions from earlier cross-country
studies.
In general, various cross-country analyses have failed to reach agreement of
what exactly the eect of democracy on economic performance is. However, it
is worth noting that the drawbacks of such cross-country studies are obvious. In
particular, as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2014), biased results on the inuence
of democracy on output growth could be generated from cross-sectional regressions
if one failed to take into account the fact of a great diversity of socioeconomic
conditions in dierent countries worldwide.
Meanwhile, empirical evidence based on panel data regressions is, again, incon-
clusive. The emergence of panel data studies on the connection between democracy
and economic performance was initially accompanied by the interest of capturing
the possible inuence of democratization. In particular, panel studies, including
Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Persson and Tabellini
(2006), and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), collectively employed Polity IV
database and constructed an index of democratization based on specic mathe-
matical criteria.
Under the xed-eects panel data regression, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005)
found some evidence that the inuence of democratic transition is benecial for
short-term economic performance. However, such a positive inuence vanishes in
the long run. In comparison, with a similar data set, Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008b) failed to nd supportive evidence, but instead suggested that democratic
transition hinders growth in the short term while it exhibits a benecial eect for
the economy only in a longer period. In another two panel studies, Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006) also found a positive eect of
democratic transformation on output growth. In particular, both papers also sug-
gested the benecial impact of democratization could be enhanced if the domestic
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economy is liberalized in advance.
Rock (2009) and Kutsen (2013) tried to measure whether democracy or autoc-
racy performs better in promoting economic performance in the context of Sub-
Saharan African countries and Asian countries respectively. In particular, both
studies proposed some consistent empirical evidence on the positive direct eect
of democracy on economic performance. Meanwhile, democracy's indirect eects,
through investment and state capacity, are highlighted in the two papers. With a
small sample of African countries, Bates et al. (2012) proposed the application of
pooled mean group estimation in their study. Consistent with previous regional
studies of Rock (2009) and Kutsen (2013), Bates et al. (2012) also found some
evidence against the prediction of \conict school" in the case of Africa.
Recent evidence based on the panel data analyses again suggested mixed re-
sults. With a large panel of 175 nations over the period 1960 to 2010, Acemoglu
et al. (2014) revealed evidence of a signicantly positive impact of democracy on
growth. Using a new dichotomous measure of democracy, Acemoglu et al. (2014)
argued the impact of democracy on economic performance is positive after con-
trolling for output dynamics. Such a nding was generally conrmed by Grundler
and Krieger (2015a, b) and Madsen et al. (2015). In comparison, other studies,
such as, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) and Jacob and Osang (2015), did not observe
any signicant inuence of democracy on economic performance.
Here, it is worth noting that the results from the panel data regressions are
not entirely free from technical concerns. Typically, issues of omitted variable bias
and collinearity between measures of democracy and other growth determinants
could lead to the misspecication of regression which threatens the reliability of
empirical ndings.
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3.3 Modelling Strategy, Data Description and
the Empirical Model
3.3.1 Introduction of Modelling Strategy
One of the fundamental diculties for the empirical study of growth is the iden-
tication of salient growth determinants. A simple approach for early empirical
scholars, for example, Barro (1996), facing this diculty was to include a set of
regressors thought to represent everything important for growth of the economy
and to employ one, or a few, regressions as if these indeed reect the real-world
mechanisms that had generated the data. (Durlauf et al., 2005; Sianesi and Van
Reenen, 2003)
However, this all-encompassing approach is obviously quite problematic. On
the one hand, as summarised by Durlauf et al. (2005), a sum of 145 dierent
explanatory variables has been investigated for the standard growth regression in
the early empirical growth studies. It is computationally impossible to employ one
single all-inclusive regression considering the number of potential growth deter-
minants could be as large as number of countries worldwide. On the other hand,
credibility of such a routine is doubtful considering that the choices of variables and
models are arbitrary in essence. Ignoring the uncertainty of model validity, any
inference based entirely on the absolute truth of these models would be imprecise
and misleading.
Several attempts have been made to formally confront the issue of model uncer-
tainty. Firstly, following Leamer (1983, 1985), Levine and Renelt (1992) extreme-
bounds analysis was proposed in the identication of key growth determinants.
Through repeating extreme-bound tests for the variables in the dataset, a regres-
sor is identied as a robust determinant of growth if both the statistical signicance
and predicted sign of this regressor do not vary across dierent model specica-
tions. On the contrary, if a regressor loses its signicance, or has a contrasting
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sign across specications, it is then labeled as fragile. Two robust growth deter-
minants, i.e. the initial level of income together with investments share in GDP,
are suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992).
Secondly, in their study in 2004, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller applied
the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach in tackling model
uncertainty. In particular, this approach requires a construction of estimates as a
weighted average of OLS estimates for every potential growth regression. Mean-
while, with sample-dominated Bayesian priors and least-squares estimates, mini-
mal prior information is applied in this BACE method. Using a balanced dataset
of 67 regressors for 88 countries, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) identied eighteen
robust determinants of long-term economic growth, which includes an East Asian
dummy, initial primary schooling enrollment rate, the average price of investment
goods, the initial level of per capita GDP, the proportion of a country's area in the
tropics, the density of the population in coastal areas, an index of malaria preva-
lence, the initial life expectancy, the fraction of population Confucian, an African
dummy, a Latin American dummy, the fraction of GDP in mining, a dummy for
former Spanish colonies, the number of years an economy has been open, the frac-
tion of the population Muslim, the fraction of the population Buddhist, an index
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and the share of government consumption in
GDP.
Thirdly, since late last century, a variety of scholars have established their spec-
ied models on the basis of solid theoretical grounding. Specically, based on the
studies of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), the textbook Solow model suggests the
growth rate of the per capita output depends on the initial per capita output, the
savings rate, the corrected population growth rate, the initial level of technology,
the technological progress rate, and the rate of convergence to the steady state.
Meanwhile, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) proposed their augmented version of
the Solow model by introducing the role of human capital accumulation. In their
cross-country regressions, per capita output growth rate is specied as a function
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of both regressors implied in the textbook Solow model, such as, the initial level
of per capita output, rate of population growth, accumulation of physical capital
etc., and the accumulation of human capital. Inspired by Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992), many following cross-country studies, Caselli, Equivel and Lefort (1996)
for example, also based their analyses on a similar theoretical set-up. The method
has also been adapted for panel data studies, including those of Bassanini et al.
(2001), Bond, Leblebicioglu and Schiantarelli (2010), and Arnold, Bassanini and
Scarpetta (2011).
Although the controversy remains over the method to resolve the identica-
tion of salient growth determinants, together with the underlying model, in our
perspective, the choice of right-hand-side regressors will adhere closely to stan-
dard theoretical models and accepted robust growth determinants. As a result,
we follow the third route described above in the specication of our empirical
regressions.
3.3.2 Model Specication
3.3.2.1 The Dependent Variable
Empirically, division remains on whether the log level or log rst dierence of per
capita output should be used as the dependent variable. On the one hand, the
majority of growth regressions, under both cross-country and panel data frame-
works, uses the rate of growth of real output per capita as the dependent variable.
However, potential long-term correlation between per capita output and regressors
of interest may not be captured under the log rst dierence specication given
a limited time span. (Madsen et al., 2015) On the other hand, many empirical
regressions applied a log level specication and explained cross-country dierences
in per capita output levels. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if such regressions could be
regarded as standard growth regressions. (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003) In addi-
tion, it is also likely for log level specications to face spurious correlations if both
the dependent variable and explanatory variables have common trends. (Madsen
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At the theoretical level, both neoclassical and endogenous growth theories ac-
cepted the roles of development of both nancial institutions and nancial markets
in the process of long-term output growth for an economy. As summarised by Ci-
hak et al. (2013), ve basic functions of nancial system could be highlighted in
the economy: (1) to enhance the quality of information, (2) to exert sound corpo-
rate governance, (3) to provide eective mechanisms for managing, pooling, and
diversifying risk, (4) to mobilize savings, and (5) to facilitate trade.
Empirically, a large number of indicators have been proposed to measure the
diverse aspects such as, size, access, eciency and stability of both nancial in-
stitutions and nancial markets. However, most of these indicators are available
only for a small number of countries or for a few points in time. (Beck et al., 2010;
Cihak et al., 2013) In the meantime, the banking system still constitutes the major
nancial systems of instrument in the most nations worldwide. As a result, given
limited choice, indicators of nancial development for this study are restricted to
measures of the size of nancial institution development. Typically, two indicators
will be introduced as detailed below.
a. Credit by nancial intermediaries to the private sector/GDP
This ratio can be regarded as a standard measure of nancial development
under the assumption that a higher ratio represents a higher quality of nancial
service and better nancial system development. Specically, it includes credit
to private enterprises from both deposit money banks and other nancial institu-
tions, and excludes credit to the private sector from the central bank, government
agencies, and public enterprises. Also, this indicator isolates any cross claims of
one group of nancial intermediaries on another and credit to the public sector.
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As a measure of the asset side of nancial intermediaries balance sheet, this ratio
captures one of the credit allocation mechanism of the nancial system and is fre-
quently used in empirical literature, such as Beck et al. (2000) and Levine et al.
(2000).
b. Deposit money banks assets/GDP
The early nance-growth literature, such as King and Levine (1993a, b), Beck
et al. (2000), and Beck and Levine (2004), emphasized the eciency and eec-
tiveness of commercial banks in identifying protable projects and facilitating risk
management. As an alternative to private credit to output, this work uses total
deposit money banks assets to GDP as another measure of domestic nancial de-
velopment. In detail, deposit money banks include commercial banks and other
nancial institutions that accept transferable deposits. Meanwhile, deposit money
banks assets include claims not just on the private sector, but also on local public
enterprises and governments. This ratio is frequently regarded as a comprehensive
indicator of size of the banking sector. As suggested by Beck et al. (2010), an econ-
omy where deposit banks have a great role in nancial intermediation generally
has a higher level of nancial development.
(2) Democracy
Controversies always exist over the constituent components and numerical form
in the construction of a most appropriate index of democracy. To be specic, it is
never clear what exactly should be evaluated given the conception of democracy,
or whether democracy should be measured as a continuous or a binary variable.
(Cheibub et al., 2010; Boix et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2014) In the meantime, it
is widely recognized that all measures of democracy are commonly subject to sub-
stantial measurement errors, given the fact that existing measures are essentially
constructed based on diverse theoretical groundings and operational procedures.
It is therefore dicult to identify the most accurate measure of democracy among
all available. (Cheibub et al., 2010; Boix et al., 2013; Grundler and Krieger, 2015b;
Jacob and Osang, 2015)
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Recent empirical studies of the eect of democracy on economic performance
have exploited the plethora of measures of democracy available from various data
sources. In particular, democracy indexes from the Polity project dataset are fre-
quently employed given their wide coverage. Meanwhile, newly-established democ-
racy measures also provide alternatives for empirical analyses. As a result, two
measures of democracy will be introduced below.
a. Polity 2 Score
Based on multiple historical sources, Polity IV, the latest version of the Polity
dataset, has constructed a series of annual measures of authority of the execu-
tive and the nature of political participation for 167 countries worldwide over the
period 1800 to 2014. Among various measures, three indicators; i.e. institutional-
ized democracy, institutionalized autocracy, and Polity score indicators have been
widely accepted in the democracy-growth literature.
Construction of these three indicators starts with the analysis of distinct qual-
ities of authority patterns. As argued by the Polity project, many authorities
exhibit a mixture of both democratic and autocratic qualities. In order to dis-
tinguish diverse authority patterns, ve attributes, namely, competitiveness of
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief ex-
ecutive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of political participation,
are assessed by awarding scores each year. On the basis of scores of each attribute,
two composite indicators, that is, institutionalized democracy and institutional-
ized autocracy indicators, could be then allocated to each country. In particular,
both indicators are essentially presented in an eleven-point scale, which ranges
from 0 (smallest level of democratic or autocratic quality) to 10 (greatest level of
democratic or autocratic quality). Further, the third indicator proposed, i.e. the
Polity score, is constructed by subtracting the institutionalized autocracy point
from the institutionalized democracy point. This Polity score indicator, which
ranges from minus 10 (strongly autocratic) to plus 10 (strongly democratic), is
frequently regarded as a convenient tool for examining general regime eects. In
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particular, the revised 21-point Polity score indicator, namely, the Polity2 score
indicator, has been frequently employed in the recent empirical literature.
b. Democracy Index of Acemoglu et al. (2014)
In their recent research, Acemoglu et al. (2014) proposed a new dichotomous
index for democracy status, which covers the post-independence period for 183
countries from 1960 to 2010 worldwide on the annual basis. In essence, this index
consolidates existing democracy measures of both continuous and dichotomous
forms.
The method of construction for this binary measure of democracy, is generally
as followed: rstly, country in year is labelled as \democratic" if the Freedom House
status is \Free" or \Partially Free" and the Polity score indicator is positive at
the same time. Secondly, for those countries covered in Freedom House sample
but not in Polity IV, if Freedom House status is \Free" or \Partially Free", and
a \democratic" status is observed from either Cheibub et al. (2010) or Boix et
al. (2013). Thirdly, for countries covered in the Polity IV dataset but not in
the Freedom House sample, especially between 1960 to 1971, if the Polity score
is positive, and either Cheibub et al. (2010) or Boix et al. (2013) conrms its
\democratic" status. Meanwhile, for some cases that both Freedom House status
of democracy and Polity score index are missing but covered by Cheibub et al.
(2010) and Boix et al. (2013), a democratic status is manually coded according to
the authors' secondary sources.
3.3.2.3 Traditional Economic Variables
(3) Initial level of per capita output
One of key arguments from neoclassical growth theory is the existence of the
convergence eect. Specically, given diminishing returns to reproducible factors,
rich countries tend to grow slower than poor countries. As a result, poor countries
will eventually catch up with rich ones. (Jones, 2002a; Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004) Meanwhile, as highlighted by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al.
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(1992), and Islam (1995), neoclassical growth models essentially did not suggest
dierent countries would reach the same level of average output but that countries
would reach their respective steady states. A negative partial relationship between
the rate of growth of average output and the initial level of output per capita is
predicted only after controlling for other explanatory variables which determine
the steady state level of output of a country. As a result, such a convergence eect
is conditional in essence. In this study, we follow previous growth literature and
include the logarithm of lagged level of per capita output on the right hand side
of the regression for the purpose of measuring the rate of conditional convergence
eect.
(4) Physical capital investment
As one of the fundamental growth determinants in the neoclassical growth
model, the savings rate is normally measured by the ratio of the gross domestic
investment to GDP. According to the Solow model, a higher volume of physical
capital investment is predicted to have a positive eect on the steady-state level
of output per capita. Meanwhile, if the transition to the new steady-state position
needs a long time, the eect of physical capital investment on the steady-state
growth rate of average output could also last for a long time during the transitional
period. Following Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Hoeer
(2002), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), we employ the ratio of gross capital
formation to annual output as the measure of physical capital investment in this
study.
(5) Human capital investment
The role of investment of human capital was emphasized strongly by Mankiw et
al. (1992) in their augmented Solow model. As another key growth determinant,
the eect of human capital investment is generally analogous to that of physical
capital investment in the neoclassical growth models. Thus, a higher volume of
human capital investment would have a positive eect on the steady-state level
of average output, and it also promotes rate of growth of average output during
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the transition interval to the new steady-state position. Meanwhile, a large body
of empirical literature restricted the focus on human capital investment in the
form of education attainment. Empirically, either by gender or by level, literacy
rates, school enrolment rates, and average years of schooling are frequently used
as indicators of education attainment in various growth studies, including Mankiw
et al. (1992), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Beck et al. (2000), Tavares and
Wacziarg (2001), Hoeer (2002), Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003), Madsen et al.
(2015) etc. For this study, we make full use of the recent published human capital
index of Penn World Tables 9.0 to measure education attainment. Typically,
this human capital index combines datasets of average years of schooling from
Barro and Lee (2013) and Cohen et al. (2014) with the assumed rate of return to
education for 150 economies worldwide.
(6) Population growth
In the neoclassical growth model, population growth has a negative eect on
the steady-state level of per capital output. And a decline in the rate of growth of
population could also promote the rate of growth of average output in the transi-
tion interval to the new steady-state position. Early empirical studies, including
Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), and Hoeer (2002),
commonly made the assumption that the correction factor of population growth,
that is, the sum of depreciation rate and technology progress rate, to be 0.05 for
all countries and this practice is followed here.
3.3.2.4 Macroeconomic Policy Variables
(7) Government consumption
As dened by World Bank, general government nal consumption includes all
government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services and national
defense and security, but excludes some military expenditures that are part of
government capital formation. In practice, the ratio of government nal consump-
tion expenditure to annual output is normally used to indicate the public outlays
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that do not directly result in any improvements of productivity in the economy.
Bassanini et al. (2001), Jones (2002a) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue
that, if government nances its unproductive consumption mainly through taxes
on income, prot, payroll and manpower, it is likely for these taxes to have a
distortionary eect on private investment decisions and the eciency of resource
allocation. As a result, ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of government nal
consumption in output would lead to a lower steady-state level of average output
in the economy. (Bassanini et al., 2001; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
(8) Openness to trade
A higher level of openness to trade is believed to have a positive eect on
the steady-state level of output per capita under the framework of neoclassical
growth models. Specically, through engaging in international trade, an economy
would generally benet from diusion of knowledge, exposure of global competi-
tiveness, exploitation of comparative advantages, and an improvement in economic
eciency. (Bassanini et al., 2001; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) Empirically,
openness to trade is frequently measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services to annual output.
(9) Ination
The rate of ination is typically measured as the consumer price index or
the GDP deator. Typically, a high rate of ination generally reects a high
degree of macroeconomic instability which could be potentially harmful to the
economy. Following Levine et al. (2000), the ination variable used here is dened
as logarithm of one plus ination rate in order to eliminate heteroskedasticity
problems associated with the high variability of ination rates.
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3.3.3 Data and Data Source
A panel dataset of 171 countries over the period 1960 to 2014 was constructed for
this study. Typically, these 171 countries (see Table A3.2) consist of 36 developed
and 135 developing economies according to International Monetary Fund.
Variables used for this study and their sources are displayed in Table A3.3.
Apart from the indicators of democracy, other measures are from the Penn World
Tables Version 9.0 and Global Financial Development dataset of World DataBank.
Data in the sample are averaged over non-overlapping ve-year intervals. Such
a data averaging process is regarded as a necessity to limit the potential measure-
ment errors and to smooth business cycle uctuations. In particular, both ve-
year and ten-year averaging processes are widely applied in the empirical growth
studies. However, it is not clear which one outperforms the other with respect to
capturing the long-term perspective of growth theory and disentangling short-term
disturbances. As a result, following a large body of previous growth studies, such
as, Mankiw et al. (1992), Caselli et al. (1996) and Hoeer (2002), the ve-year
averaging process is applied. Specically, the 11 ve-year periods are dened as
1960-1964,. . . , 2005-2009, 2010-2014. At the same time, given the data is not avail-
able for all 171 countries for all 11 periods, the panel is essentially unbalanced.
3.3.4 Empirical Model
The empirical specication for ve-year average model is shown as:
git =  + yit 1 + xit + i + pt + vit (3.1)
where i and t stand for 171 countries and 11 ve-year periods. vit is the idiosyn-
cratic error term, i is the time-invariant country-specic eect. pt are the eleven
time dummies, which are included under the assumption of no correlation across
individuals in vit.
Meanwhile, the dependent variable, git, is the rate of growth of real average
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output, i.e. the logarithm dierence in real output per capita (GROWTH). yit 1 is
the lagged logarithm of the level of real average output (GDP(-1)). xit is a vector
of other explanatory variables. To be specic, it includes:
(1) a measure of democracy, for example, rescaled Polity2 score (POLITY2);
(2) an indicator of nancial development, that is, logarithm of the ratio of
private sector credit issued by nancial intermediaries to GDP (FINDEV1), or,
logarithm of the ratio of deposit money banks assets over GDP (FINDEV2);
(3) logarithm of the ratio of the gross domestic investment to GDP (INVEST);
(4) averaged human capital index from the Penn World Tables (HC), con-
structed on the basis of average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and
Cohen et al. (2014);
(5) logarithm of the population growth rate plus 0.05 (POP);
(6) logarithm of the ratio of general government nal consumption to GDP
(GOV);
(7) logarithm of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services to GDP (TRADE);
(8) logarithm of one plus ination rate (INF).
In addition, the lagged logarithm of real per capita GDP is assumed to be
predetermined while all the other variables on the right hand side are assumed to
be endogenous.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the ve-year averaged variables used
for this study. Here, the values for growth rates of average output and population
are the total of the growth over the ve-year averages. From Table 3.1, the mean
of the growth rate of per capita GDP is 9.7%. The highest average GDP growth
rate, 113.4%, is from Equatorial Guinea for the period 2000-2004 while the lowest
is from Liberia for the period 1990-1994. Meanwhile, the highest per capita GDP
is from United Arab Emirates for the period 1970-1974, followed by Qatar in the
same period, while, the lowest average GDP level value is from Myanmar for 1965
to 1969. The largest values of our two nancial development indicators collectively
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come from Cyprus in the period 2010 to 2014. The smallest values of two indicators
are from Democratic Republic of the Congo for 1980-1984.
Correlation analyses among these variables are shown in Table 3.2. As we do
not observe high correlations among the explanatory variables from this table, the
issue of multicollinearity is not considered in the following regressions. Meanwhile,
two measures of nancial development are highly correlated with a correlation of
over 0.9, and so are the two measures of democracy. However, the correlation
between a single measure of nancial development and a single measure of democ-
racy is moderate, which is generally around 0.4. In addition, a positive and strong



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Given the growth rate of per capita output is the logarithm dierence in output
per capita, the dynamic panel data model has the form as below:
yit   yit 1 =  + yit 1 + xit + i + vit (3.2)
or, equivalently,
yit =  + 
yit 1 + xit + i + vit (3.3)
where  = +1. Typically, the process shown by equation (3.3) is dynamic given
the current realization of the dependent variable is inuenced by its previous value,
yit 1. Here, we also assume the standard error components structure:
E [i] = E [vit] = E [ivit] = 0; i = 1;    ; N ; t = 2;    ; T (3.4)
idiosyncratic errors are assumed to be serially uncorrelated:
E [vitvis] = 0; i = 1;    ; N ; t 6= s (3.5)
Further, the initial conditions are predetermined:
E [yi1vit] = 0; i = 1;    ; N ; t = 2;    ; T (3.6)
3.4.2 OLS and Within Group Estimation
The ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator suers from dynamic panel bias in
the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Given the fact that it is positively
correlated to the xed eect, the OLS estimate of the coecient of the lagged
dependent variable is generally inconsistent and biased upwards.
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To confront the endogeneity one solution is to employ the Within Group (WG)
estimator. To be specic, one needs to transform equation (3.3) as the expres-
sion of deviations of each variable from its time series mean. Although the in-
dividual country eects are eliminated, a negative correlation exists between the
transformed idiosyncratic error and the transformed lagged dependent variable as
argued by Nickell (1981). As a result, the WG estimator is inconsistent and biased
downwards.
In the meantime, according to Bond et al. (2001), Hoeer (2002), and Rood-
man (2009a, b), the OLS levels estimate and the WG estimate of the coecient
of the lagged dependent variable can be treated as approximate upper and lower
bounds. Normally, a candidate consistent estimator should be lie between two
estimates in a well specied model. If not, issues such as inconsistency and severe
nite sample bias for the estimator should be suspected.
3.4.3 Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Method of
Moments Estimation
Another attempt to confront the issue of endogeneity is to apply rst-dierencing
transformation; that is, subtracting the one period lagged equation (3.3) from the
original:
yit   yit 1 =  (yit 1   yit 2) +  (xit   xit 1) + vit   vit 1 (3.7)
or,
yit = 
yit 1 + xit +vit (3.8)
Again, the time-invariant individual-specic eects are eliminated. However,
given the correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the
transformed error term, the OLS estimator is inconsistent. Nevertheless, Arellano
and Bond (1991) suggested that values of yit lagged two periods and more are cor-
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related with yit 1 while orthogonal with vit. As a result, yit 2 and earlier values
are valid instruments in the rst-dierenced equation. Arellano and Bond (1991)
further proposed the rst-dierenced Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimator, which has the capacity of delivering consistent and asymptotically e-
cient estimates in a standard large N , small T panel model. In general, a sum of
(T   1)(T   2)=2 moment conditions can be exploited:
E (yit lvit) = 0; t = 3;    ; T; l  2 (3.9)
3.4.4 Blundell and Bond (1998) System Generalised
Method of Moments Estimation
Initially, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that
the rst-dierence GMM estimator suers from a potential large downward small
sample bias. Such a bias could occur if the time series of instrumented variable
is persistent, or the relative variance of the individual xed eect is high. To be
specic, little correlation exists between past levels and subsequent changes if the
series is like a random walk. As a result, level instruments are likely to be weak for
rst-dierenced variables, leading to large nite sample biases and poor precision
under the dynamic panel framework.
To increase the eciency of estimation, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) further proposed the system GMM estimator, which largely
improved both consistency and eciency in Monte Carlo simulations. In partic-
ular, a system of two sets of equations is estimated. One is the rst-dierenced
equation (3.8), where rst-dierenced variables are instrumented by their level val-
ues. The other is a level equation (3.3), where level variables are instrumented by
rst-dierenced values. An additional (T  2) moment restrictions can be derived:
E [yit 1 (i + vit)] = 0; t = 3;    ; T; i  1 (3.10)
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Meanwhile, it is worth noticing here that the extra (T   2) moment conditions
are only valid when the stationarity assumption is satised:
E (yi2i) = 0; i  1 (3.11)
As suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998), this assumption essentially requires
a mean stationarity restriction on the initial conditions. If not, individual xed
eects and the autoregressive process of yit cannot oset in expectation of the
other, which further results in the failure of the additional moment conditions
(3.10).
3.4.5 Instrument Proliferation and Strategies
Both dierence and system GMM estimators are widely regarded as popular means
for the dynamic panel data model estimation. However, it is worth noting here that
both methods are far from perfect. A typical issue when applying GMM estimators
is the problem of \too many instruments". (Roodman, 2009a, b) Essentially, the
number of instruments is quadratic in T in both GMM estimations. If T is large,
it is likely that the instrument count may exceed sample size for a nite sample.
The rst concern associated with instrument proliferation is the possibility
of instruments overtting endogenous variables. Second, instrument proliferation
could potentially hinder the asymptotically ecient property of GMM estimation.
Besides, instrument proliferation can also lead to a weak Hansen test of instrument
validity. In addition, given the orthogonality assumption (3.10), the left-hand-side
variable ought to either reach the long-term steady state in rst sample period
(t = 1) or stay the same distance away from steady state points for all N in the
system GMM estimation. However, in the context of empirical growth models, it
is dicult to identify whether either of these two stands for per capita GDP series
for various countries in the sample. (Roodman, 2009a, b)
For empirical studies, it is not yet clear what is a reasonable instrument count.
As a liberal rule, Roodman (2009a, b) suggested that the instrument count should
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not exceed N . In practice, various methods have been adopted in order to reduce
the number of instruments. The rst is to select certain lags in the instrument
set instead of all the available ones. The second is to collapse the instrument set.
When applying either of these two methods, the instrument count is restricted to
be linear in T . The third is to collapse and to limit lag depth of the instrument set
at the same time. Under such a combination, the instrument count is essentially
invariant to T . In the meantime, Mehrho (2009), Kapetanios and Marcellino
(2010), Bai and Ng (2010), and Bontempi and Mammi (2012), highlighted the
application of principal component analysis in confronting the issue of \too many
instruments". To be specic, a principal component analysis is conducted on the
correlation matrix of the GMM instruments. The principal components with the
largest eigenvalues are then selected as instruments instead of GMM instruments.
Such a method is regarded as a generally data-driven and essentially an arbitrary
way in reducing the instrument count in recent literature.
As suggested by Mehrho (2009) and Bontempi and Mammi (2012), the rst
three methods mentioned earlier involve a certain extent of arbitrariness. For
example, variation in the number of lags included and collapsing the instrument set
may lead to diverse results and diculties in the interpretation of any robustness
check. It is also likely to distort the reliance in the restrictions implicitly imposed
on the instrument matrix. As a result, we rely on principal component analysis in
order to limit the instrument count for this study.
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3.5 Regression Results
3.5.1 Baseline Regression Results: The Augmented Solow
model
This section provides an empirical examination of the augmented Solow model
under the dynamic panel data framework 2 Table 3.3 shows the results.3
In the rst column, OLS level estimates are displayed. Clearly, all variables are
signicant at the one percent level with the expected signs: the eect of initial level
of per capita GDP is negative on the sequential per capital GDP growth, which
could be interpreted as the evidence of existence of conditional convergence. In
particular, the implied speed of convergence is around one percent per annum.4The
eects of both physical capital investment and human capital on the growth rate
of average output are positive while that of population growth is negative.
In the second column, the WG estimator is applied. Here, only the lagged level
per capita GDP and physical capital investment are signicant with expected signs
in this column. In comparison to the OLS estimates, the human capital index
and population growth are insignicant. Also, the estimated coecient of lagged
average output is larger in absolute terms than the one suggested by the OLS level
estimation. In particular, the implied speed of conditional convergence becomes
3.5% per annum, which is much higher than the one obtained from OLS level
estimation.
The two-step rst-dierenced GMM estimator is used in the third column of
Table 3.3. As mentioned earlier, lagged average output is assumed to be predeter-
mined and the other three regressors are assumed to be endogenous in the analyses.
Meanwhile, the work does not apply restrictions on the count of instruments in
2The empirical examination of the Solow model can be found in Table 3.4 in the appendix.
3Time dummies are included which are jointly signicant in the regressions.
4The convergence rate () measures the speed at which a country's output converges to its
steady-state level. Following Hoeer (2002) and Arnold et al. (2011), the estimate for  can be
recovered from the coecient on lagged output, , as:  =  (1  e t) and  = ln(1+) t , where
t is the length of the time interval, that is 5 in this study.
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Table 3.3: Baseline regression results: Augmented Solow Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS WG DIF-GMM SYS-GMM DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.052*** -0.160*** -0.163*** -0.072*** -0.353 -0.095*** -0.105***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.033) (0.013) (0.348) (0.026) (0.030)
INVEST 0.090*** 0.106*** 0.071*** 0.131*** 0.243*** 0.219*** 0.249***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.080) (0.038) (0.034)
HC 0.056*** 0.056 -0.111* 0.080*** 1.499 0.112** 0.103*
(0.014) (0.041) (0.067) (0.024) (0.907) (0.044) (0.052)
POP -0.029*** -0.012 -0.030 -0.045*** -0.050 -0.026 -0.052*
(0.010) (0.020) (0.030) (0.016) (0.077) (0.017) (0.031)
Constant 0.583*** 1.533*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.071) (0.132) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Implied  0.011 0.035 0.036 0.015 0.087 0.020 0.022
(0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.152) (0.006) (0.006)
Obs 1,283 1,283 1,137 1,283 1,137 1,283 1,283
Countries 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
No. of IVs 189 226 25 42 40
AR(1) 0.001 0.001 0.792 0.003 0.005
AR(2) 0.043 0.023 0.823 0.020 0.018
Hansen test 0.984 1.000 0.176 0.006 0.093
No. of PCs 16 32 30
PCA R2 0.931 0.885 0.875
KMO 0.940 0.935 0.929
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. The dependent variable
is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time dummies are included in all columns. Two-step GMM
estimator is used with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) tests examine
serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of order 1 and 2. p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) are
reported in the table. Hansen test examines over-identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen test are
reported in the table. PCA R2 is the part of the variance explained by the principal components.
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures the sampling adequacy of principal components.
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this column. To be specic, instruments for dierence GMM are two period lagged
and all further lagged values of per capita GDP, physical capital investment, hu-
man capital and population growth rate. Clearly, the coecients of lagged average
output and physical capital investment are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The estimated coecient of the human capital index is negative and signicant at
the 10% level. Although the sign of this coecient is unexpected, such a nding is
not new. Notably, Bond et al. (2001) and Hoeer (2002) also observed a negative
eect of human capital on output growth when the rst-dierenced GMM estima-
tor is applied. The eect of population growth on output growth is insignicant in
this column. In particular, the coecient of lagged per capita GDP is very close to
the WG estimate in Column 2. Such a nding is again consistent with Bond et al.
(2001) and Hoeer (2002). Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that the dierence
GMM is likely to be seriously biased downwards in a nite sample. As a result,
the implied speed of conditional convergence is similar to the one found by the
WG estimator.
Column 4 displays the results of two-step system GMM estimator. Again,
no restrictions are applied for the instrument count. Specically, for the rst-
dierenced equations, the same set of instruments are used as in dierence GMM
estimation of Column 3. For the level equations, additional instruments are es-
sentially rst-dierenced values of one period lagged average output, one period
lagged physical capital investment, and one period lagged population growth rate.
It is apparent that all the estimated coecients are statistically signicant at the
1% level under the system GMM estimation. In particular, the coecient of lagged
output lies between the upper and lower bounds obtained from rst two columns
in Table 3.3. The estimated speed of conditional convergence is 1.5 percent per
annum.
It is worth noting here that two GMM estimation results in Columns 3 and 4
demonstrate the threats of instrument proliferation issue. Typically, the p-values of
Hansen tests in both columns are generally 1. To confront such an issue, principal
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component analysis is then used to reduce the instrument count.
In Column 5, the two-step rst-dierence estimates are presented. To be spe-
cic, the principal component analysis is applied on the original instrument ma-
trix used in Column 3. The GMM instruments are essentially replaced by their
16 principal components, which explains the majority of variation in the instru-
ments. Meanwhile, the value of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling
adequacy is above 0.9, which implies the well-performance of 16 principal compo-
nents. Correspondingly, the instrument count is restricted to 25. In addition, no
evidence of an AR(2) structure is found in the rst-dierenced idiosyncratic error
term. The Hansen test upholds the validity of instruments used. Noticeably, the
estimated coecient on physical capital investment retains its signicance. How-
ever, the coecient of lagged per capita GDP, the human capital index, and the
population growth rate are statistically insignicant. Again, it is likely that, due
to weak instruments, the dierence GMM estimate suers from downwards bias
in the small sample.
A two-step system GMM estimator is employed in the Column 6 of Table
3.3. Again, the principal component analysis is used on the original instrument
matrix constructed in Column 4. A sum of 32 principal components replaces
the instrument set and the number of instruments drops 42. However, an AR(2)
structure is observed in the rst-dierenced idiosyncratic error term. As suggested
by Bond et al. (2001), the original instrument matrix structure should be modied
in this case. In particular, for the rst-dierenced equation, the two lagged period
values of real average output, physical capital investment, the index of human
capital, and the rate of population growth are omitted.5
The last column of Table 3.3 displays the two-step system GMM estimation
5Bond et al. (2001) argued the assumption (3.5) that there is no serial correlation in the vit is
checked via testing for no second-order serial correlation in the rst-dierenced residuals. Given
the AR(2) structure in vit, we have E [vitvit 2] 6= 0, i.e. E [(vit   vit 1)(vit 2   vit 3)] 6= 0.
It implies E [vitvit 1] 6= 0 due to the correlation between the vit 1 in vit and the vit 2 in vit 2.
As a result, when l = 2, the moment condition (3.9) does not stand as E [yit 2(vit   vit 1)] 6= 0.
yit 2 would not be a valid IV and needs to be omitted in the rst-dierenced equations. However,
yit 3 and deeper lags remain available as instruments, for instance, E [yit 3(vit   vit 1)] = 0.
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results after modifying the instrument matrix used in Column 4 earlier. Similarly,
the principal component analysis is used on the new instrument set for the purpose
of reducing the instrument count. To be specic, the modied GMM instruments
are substituted by 30 principal components. These components collectively are
capable of explaining over 90% of the variation in the instruments, and generally
perform well according to a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value of 0.929. At the
same time, an AR(2) structure is again observed. However, as we do not observe
any evidence of a higher order autocorrelation in the rst-dierenced idiosyncratic
error, the application of the modied instrument matrix is appropriate.
From the last column, all four estimated coecients are signicant at the 10%
level at least with the expected signs. The impact of initial per capita GDP level
has a negative eect on sequential per capita GDP growth, which suggests the
existence of conditional convergence. The coecient of initial average output again
falls between the upper and lower bounds obtained by OLS and WG estimates.
Here, the implied speed of convergence is 2.2 percent per annum.
Earlier growth studies, including Mankiw et al. (1992) and Caselli et al. (1996),
Bond et al. (2001) and Hoeer (2002), provided examinations of the augmented
Solow model. However, due to the diversity of the measures, assumptions, and
estimation methods, the estimated conditional convergence rate diers at the em-
pirical level. For instance, the conditional convergence rate is approximately ten
percent a year in Caselli et al. (1996). On the contrary, both Bond et al. (2001)
and Hoeer (2002) observed an estimated speed of convergence around two per-
cent per annum under the system GMM estimator. Using the same estimator, the
implied conditional convergence rate in the analysis presented here is generally
close to the ones found in Bond et al. (2001) and Hoeer (2002).
Meanwhile, from Column 7 of Table 3.3, the eects of physical capital invest-
ment on output growth is positive and signicant at the 1% level. The magnitude
of such an eect is similar to that found under the rst-dierenced GMM estima-
tor. The impact of the rate of population on economic growth is negative at the
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10% level. In addition, the eect of the human capital index on output growth is
positive, although it is only signicant at the weak 10% level.
It is obvious from Table 3.3 that the sign and magnitude of the estimated eect
of human capital on economic growth dier given dierent estimation methods.
And such an eect is not always signicant at the conventional 5% level. As
suggested by Pritchett (2001) and Hoeer (2002), it is common to observe a non-
robust partial relationship between the human capital indicator and growth in
growth studies. In particular, deciencies may exist in the human capital index
used, which is essentially based on average years of schooling. For instance, Sianesi
and Van Reenen (2003) argued that human capital indicators based on formal
schooling generally fail to account for any other aspect of education attainment,
for example, on-the-job training. Similarly, quality of schooling is also hardly
captured with aggregate measures of education attainment. (Sianesi and Van
Reenen, 2003; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) Although Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) suggested that one may use scores of globally comparable tests as proxies
of education quality, such tests, for example, programs for international student
assessment, are currently only available for a relatively small number of countries
and for a limited time period.
3.5.2 Baseline Regression Results: Additional Regressors
Table 3.4 reports the results of our baseline regressions with additional regressors.
Four dierent estimators, i.e. OLS, WG, rst-dierencing GMM and system GMM
estimators have been applied for the purpose of result comparisons. Here, lagged
average output is assumed to be predetermined. While other explanatory variables,
namely, physical capital investment, the human capital index, the corrected rate
of the growth of population, general government consumption, trade openness,
ination, nancial development and democracy, are assumed to be endogenous in
the analyses. In particular, private sector credit to GDP and rescaled POLITY2
score are selected as measures of nancial system development and democracy.
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Table 3.4: Baseline regression results: Additional Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS WG DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.070*** -0.212*** -0.533*** -0.117***
(0.010) (0.024) (0.134) (0.022)
INVEST 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.128*** 0.126***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.027)
HC 0.046*** 0.055 0.424 0.076*
(0.016) (0.047) (0.309) (0.042)
POP -0.035*** -0.029 -0.077 -0.062**
(0.010) (0.018) (0.088) (0.030)
GOV -0.025 -0.047** 0.022 -0.087*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.096) (0.046)
TRADE 0.031*** 0.057*** 0.172*** 0.077**
(0.010) (0.017) (0.059) (0.037)
INF -0.046 -0.020 -0.007 0.100
(0.032) (0.025) (0.094) (0.061)
FINDEV1 0.020*** -0.002 -0.007 0.018**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.030) (0.008)
POLITY2 -0.009 0.089** 0.210 -0.054
(0.025) (0.038) (0.258) (0.083)
FINDEV1*POLITY2 0.003 0.067*** 0.170* 0.015
(0.013) (0.019) (0.091) (0.026)
Constant 0.766*** 1.911*** 0.000
(0.096) (0.189) (0.000)
Obs 1,121 1,121 978 1,121
Countries 134 134 133 134
No. of IVs 52 88
AR(1) 0.704 0.000
AR(2) 0.373 0.083
Hansen test 0.110 0.106
No. of PCs 43 78
PCA R2 0.886 0.856
KMO 0.930 0.925
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time
dummies are included in all columns. Two-step GMM estimator is
used with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. AR(1) and
AR(2) tests examine serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of
order 1 and 2. p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) are reported in the table.
Hansen test examines over-identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen
test are reported in the table. PCA R2 is the part of the variance
explained by the principal components. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
measures the sampling adequacy of principal components.
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Meanwhile, an interaction term between the nancial development and democracy
measures, that is, FINDEV1*POLITY2, is added into the preferred specication
(3.1) in order to test the hypothesis of whether nancial development requires
democracy as an institutional condition in the process of promoting economic
growth for various countries worldwide. If the hypothesis is valid, it would be
expected that this interaction term would be statistically signicant. In addition,
time dummies are also included which are jointly signicant in the regressions.
To start with, the OLS level estimation results are displayed in the rst col-
umn in Table 3.4. Firstly, the signicant and negative coecient of lagged average
GDP can be regarded as proof of the conditional convergence. In addition, the
estimated coecients of physical capital formation, human capital index, and pop-
ulation growth are all statistically signicant at the 1% level with expected signs.
Meanwhile, among the macroeconomic policy and institutional variables, the es-
timated eect of trade openness is also signicant on output growth at the 1%
level. In particular, a one percent increase of international trade leads to a three
percent increase in average GDP growth according to OLS level estimation. In
comparison, the coecients of both government consumption and ination rate
are insignicant in the rst column of Table 3.4. Also, the coecient on nancial
system development is also signicantly positive: a one percent increase of private
sector credit is associated with a two percent increase in growth. In addition, using
the OLS level estimator, the estimated coecient of POLITY2 on growth is not
statistically signicant and neither is the joint eect of FINDEV1*POLITY2.
In Column 2, the WG estimator is applied. The estimated coecient of lagged
level of average output is again negative and signicant at the 1% level. However,
the magnitude of such an eect is much larger in absolute terms than that from
OLS estimate. Another explanatory variable that remains signicant is physical
capital formation. Typically, a one percent increase of the investment of physical
capital promotes average output growth by over eight percent. Such a nding is
basically similar to that of OLS estimation earlier. In the meantime, the eects of
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human capital and population growth are not statistically signicant according to
the WG estimation. Moreover, the estimated coecient of government consump-
tion on growth is negative, which is signicant at the 5% level. A one percent
increase of government consumption generally leads to an approximate ve per-
cent decline on the average output growth. To compare, the estimated eect of
trade openness on growth is positive and signicant at the 1% level. A one per-
cent increase of openness to trade leads to a ve percent increase on per capita
output growth. However, ination, again, still does not exert a signicant impact
on growth in Column 2. At the same time, using the WG estimator, the estimated
coecient of private credit on growth is also insignicant. In comparison, a posi-
tive and signicant impact of democracy indicator, Polity 2 score, on average GDP
growth is observed in the second column of Table 3.4. In addition, the interaction
term, FINDEV1*POLITY2, is also found to exert a signicantly positive eect on
the growth rate of per capita GDP at the 1% level. Such a nding reveals some
evidence that democracy, a typical institutional condition, contributes to nancial
development in the process of stimulating domestic economic growth worldwide.
In the third column, the regression results using the two-step dierence GMM
estimator are presented. In order to avoid the potential issue of instrument prolif-
eration, the principal component analysis is applied. As a result, the instrument
count is restricted to 52 in this column, which is smaller than the number of coun-
tries in the regression. Validity of such a set of instruments is supported by the
Hansen test with a p-value of 0.11. Also, no evidence of an AR(2) structure is
found in the rst-dierenced idiosyncratic errors.
Similar to the estimates in the rst two columns, a signicant and negative
coecient of lagged per capita GDP is, again, observed in Column 3. Nonetheless,
the estimated coecient is much greater in absolute terms than the one obtained
by the WG estimator. Such a nding is generally in line with the argument of Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) which suggested that the rst-dierenced GMM is likely to
be seriously biased downwards in a nite sample. Also, the coecient of physical
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capital formation is signicant and a one percent increase of physical capital in-
vestment is associated with a more than a twelve percent increase in real per capita
GDP growth. Meanwhile, the eects of either human capital or population growth
are generally insignicant under the rst-dierenced GMM estimator. A positive
eect of trade openness, which is signicant at the 1% level, is also revealed in this
column. Noticeably, the estimated coecient of the measure of nancial develop-
ment, private sector credit to GDP, is insignicant and so is that of the democracy
indicator when using the dierence GMM estimator. The estimated coecient of
the interaction term, FINDEV1*POLITY2, is positive and signicant at the 10%
level.
Column 4 of Table 3.4 displays the two-step system GMM estimation results.
Again, principal component analysis is applied and a set of 88 instruments is used.
Validity of such an instrument set is proved via Hansen test and no evidence of an
AR(2) structure is found in the rst-dierenced idiosyncratic errors.
From Column 4, the estimated coecient of lagged per capita GDP is again
statistically signicant at the 1% level. In particular, this coecient falls between
the upper bound of OLS estimate and lower bound of WG estimate. The implied
speed of conditional convergence is approximately 2.5% per annum. The eect
of physical capital investment is signicantly positive as before. Generally, a one
percent increase of physical capital investment leads to a thirteen percent increase
in real per capita output growth. Meanwhile, the coecient for the human capital
index on average GDP growth is positive, but is only signicant at the 10% level.
The impact of population growth is signicantly negative at the 5% level. A one
percent increase of the corrected rate of population growth is associated with a
six percent decline of the average output growth. The estimated coecient of
government consumption is also negative and signicant at the 10% level. The
nding of a negative eect on output growth of government spending is consistent
with some existing empirics on growth and government expenditure, such as, Barro
(1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2002). As suggested by Bassanini et al. (2001) and
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), this detrimental impact on economic performance
could be largely due to distortionary taxation. In general, if the nancing of
government expenditure is mainly through taxation on income and prot or on
payroll and manpower, this taxation could distort the incentives of investment
on physical capital and human capital, and decrease the eciency of resource
allocation. Typically, these negative impacts of government expenditure could be
severe when government activities are extended into the areas which can be more
eciently carried out in the private sector. (Bassanini et al., 2001; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 2004) Moreover, the impact of trade openness on GDP growth is
positive and signicant. A one percent increase of openness to trade generally
leads to a 7.7 percentage increase on per capita output growth in Column 4. In
addition, the coecient of nancial system development indicator, FINDEV1, is
also signicantly positive in the system GMM estimation. It is suggested that a
one percent increase of private sector credit to GDP is associated with a nearly
two percent increase in growth. Such a nding is similar to that of OLS level
estimation. However, the eect of democracy measure, POLITY2, is statistically
insignicant. Likewise, the impact of the interaction term, FINDEV1*POLITY2,
on average output growth is also not signicant. As a result, based on the system
GMM estimation, nancial development per se has the capacity of exerting a
signicantly positive impact on economic growth.
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3.5.3 Robustness Check
In the robustness check, the democracy measure of Acemoglu et al. (2014) is used
as the alternative democracy indicator. An interaction term between nancial
development and democracy measures, that is, FINDEV1*ACE, is included in
the regressions to examine the hypothesis of whether the development of nancial
sector requires democracy in the process of promoting economic growth. Table
3.5 shows the results. Typically, for both GMM estimations, the construction of
GMM instrument sets follows the same procedure as in the last two columns of
Table 3.4.
From Table 3.5, there is strong evidence of the existence of conditional conver-
gence eect considering the estimated coecients of lagged per capita GDP are
negative and statistically signicant at 1% level in all four columns. Typically, the
coecient of lagged per capita GDP of system GMM estimation is located between
those of OLS and WG estimations. According to system GMM estimator, the im-
plied speed of convergence is approximately 2.5 percent per annum. Meanwhile,
physical capital investment always has a positive eect on output growth, which is
signicant at the 5% level at least throughout dierent regressions. Specically, a
one percentage increase in the share of physical capital investment to GDP would
lead to around a ten percentage increase in average GDP growth. Besides, based
on both GMM estimators, the estimated coecients of human capital index, cor-
rected population growth, government consumption, and ination are generally
insignicant at the conventional 5% level. Also, the impact of openness to trade
on GDP growth is positive and signicant in all four columns, although the mag-
nitude varies according to dierent estimators. In addition, some evidence of a
signicant and positive eect of nancial sector development is revealed according
to OLS and system GMM estimators. A one percent increase of private credit to
GDP is associate with a two percent increase in per capita GDP growth approx-
imately. The estimated coecient of either democracy measure, i.e. ACE, or the
interaction term, i.e. FINDEV1*ACE, is positive and statistically signicant at
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Table 3.5: Robustness check: alternative measure of democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS WG DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.068*** -0.181*** -0.602*** -0.120***
(0.010) (0.024) (0.170) (0.025)
INVEST 0.082*** 0.093*** 0.128** 0.118***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.065) (0.021)
HC 0.040*** 0.035 0.484* 0.075
(0.015) (0.045) (0.291) (0.055)
POP -0.035*** -0.030* 0.013 -0.048
(0.009) (0.018) (0.099) (0.035)
GOV -0.022 -0.042** 0.152 -0.069
(0.017) (0.019) (0.103) (0.044)
TRADE 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.216*** 0.086**
(0.009) (0.017) (0.071) (0.037)
INF -0.047 -0.026 -0.043 0.064
(0.031) (0.026) (0.086) (0.056)
FINDEV1 0.021*** 0.007 0.021 0.029***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.041) (0.011)
ACE -0.008 0.067** 0.308 -0.065
(0.018) (0.029) (0.247) (0.058)
FINDEV1*ACE -0.002 0.038** 0.162* 0.003
(0.010) (0.015) (0.085) (0.022)
Constant 0.764*** 1.708*** 0.000
(0.091) (0.176) (0.000)
Obs 1,174 1,174 1,025 1,174
Countries 140 140 140 140
No. of IVs 57 90
AR(1) 0.674 0.000
AR(2) 0.820 0.051
Hansen test 0.580 0.121
No. of PCs 48 80
PCA R2 0.881 0.846
KMO 0.93 0.925
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant
at 10%. The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita
GDP. Time dummies are included in all columns. Two-step GMM
estimator is used with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard er-
rors. AR(1) and AR(2) tests examine serial correlation in the rst-
dierenced errors of order 1 and 2. p-values of AR(1) and AR(2)
are reported in the table. Hansen test examines over-identifying
restrictions. p-values of Hansen test are reported in the table.
PCA R2 is the part of the variance explained by the principal
components. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures the sampling
adequacy of principal components.
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the 5% level only when using WG estimator.
In the second part of robustness check, an alternative nancial development
indicator, that is, deposit money banks assets to GDP, is used in the analyses.
Meanwhile, the indicator of democracy is the rescaled Polity 2 score. Again, four
estimation methods are employed, results of which can be found in Table 3.6. In
line with regressions earlier, for the two GMM estimations, the construction of
GMM instrument sets and approach of reducing instrument counts are same as
before. A series of diagnostic tests on the bottom of the table generally suggest
the validity of the instrument sets used for the GMM estimations.
As before, the eect of lagged per capita GDP level has a signicantly neg-
ative eect on the per capita GDP growth throughout dierent regressions here.
Similarly, the impact of international trade on growth is statistically signicant
with a positive sign in all four columns. Typically, there is some evidence of posi-
tive eect of nancial development based on OLS, and system GMM estimations.
A one percent increase of the ratio of deposit money banks' assets to GDP gen-
erally leads to a two percent increase of the growth of per capita GDP. At the
same time, the estimated coecient of democracy on output growth is generally
insignicant at the 5% level. However, under the WG estimation, the joint eect
of FINDEV2*POLITY2 is signicant at the 1% level with a positive sign. Such
nding when adopting WG estimator is generally consistent with what we observe
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Given the majority of the countries in our sample are developing economies,
we further examine whether the eects of nancial development and democracy
found in the full sample dier for these developing countries. Table A3.5 in the ap-
pendix shows the regression results using the system GMM estimator. Specically,
dierent measures of nancial development and democracy have been adopted in
each of the four columns. From Table A3.5, we observe signicant eects of lagged
average output and physical capital investment on output growth for the 135 de-
veloping countries over the sample period. Meanwhile, the estimated coecient of
100
Table 3.6: Robustness check: alternative measure of nancial development
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS WG DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.070*** -0.204*** -0.464*** -0.114***
(0.010) (0.025) (0.107) (0.022)
INVEST 0.082*** 0.091*** 0.128*** 0.109***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.047) (0.027)
HC 0.047*** 0.047 0.452 0.085*
(0.016) (0.047) (0.296) (0.043)
POP -0.035*** -0.030* -0.131** -0.047
(0.010) (0.018) (0.059) (0.032)
GOV -0.027 -0.045** 0.035 -0.096**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.107) (0.045)
TRADE 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.173*** 0.082**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.053) (0.034)
INF -0.045 -0.022 -0.037 0.080
(0.032) (0.026) (0.096) (0.063)
FINDEV2 0.024*** -0.007 0.005 0.017**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.035) (0.008)
POLITY2 -0.015 0.066* 0.157 -0.035
(0.027) (0.035) (0.243) (0.086)
FINDEV2*POLITY2 -0.000 0.061*** 0.154 0.015
(0.015) (0.018) (0.098) (0.031)
Constant 0.769*** 1.861*** 1.044***
(0.093) (0.193) (0.249)
Obs 1,123 1,123 980 1,123
Countries 134 134 133 134
No. of IVs 52 88
AR(1) 0.638 0
AR(2) 0.256 0.079
Hansen test 0.154 0.102
No. of PCs 43 78
PCA R2 0.884 0.855
KMO 0.931 0.926
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time
dummies are included in all columns. Two-step GMM estimator is
used with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. AR(1) and
AR(2) tests examine serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of
order 1 and 2. p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) are reported in the table.
Hansen test examines over-identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen
test are reported in the table. PCA R2 is the part of the variance
explained by the principal components. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
measures the sampling adequacy of principal components.
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either democracy or its interaction with nancial development is not statistically
signicant. Also, we; again; nd some evidence of a signicant and positive eect
of nancial development on output performance from this table. Generally, for
developing economies, a one percent increase of the ratio of deposit money banks'
assets to GDP leads to a two percent increase of the per capita GDP growth.
In the last part of robustness check, we test the potential nonlinearity in the
nance-growth relationship.6From Table A3.6 in the appendix, the system GMM
estimation reveals, again, a signicantly positive linear eect of nancial devel-
opment. However, the nonlinear eect of nance on growth is not statistically
signicant. Also from this table, we fail to nd any evidence supporting the signif-
icance of either a linear or a nonlinear eect of democracy on economic performance
over the sample period.
6A literature review of the nonlinear relationship between nancial development and economic
performance can be found in Chapter 4.
102
3.6 Conclusion
The eect of nancial development on economic growth has been controversial
for decades. Despite its hypothesized benets, certain studies have revealed a
detrimental impact of nance on long-run output performance. In particular, we
notice that democracy, which is frequently emphasized as an important institu-
tional condition for economic progress, has been largely ignored in the existing
nance-growth research.
This chapter contributes to the previous literature by testing the impact of
democratic institutions on the relationship between nancial development and
economic growth. With a large panel of 171 economies over the period 1960 to
2014, we specically examine the interaction between nancial development and
democracy to investigate the hypothesis that democracy is a key condition which
compounds the growth-eect of nancial development.
Dierent indicators of nancial development are constructed alongside both
standard and newly introduced measures of democracy. Diverse panel estimators,
namely, OLS, WG, rst-dierenced GMM, and system GMM estimators, are uti-
lized in our panel estimation. To confront the issue of instrument proliferation, a
data-driven method is applied in the reduction of instrument count in the GMM
estimation.
The baseline results show that the estimated coecient of lagged average out-
put on the out growth is statistically signicant. Meanwhile, the impacts of both
physical capital investment and openness to trade on growth are always signicant
with positive signs. Also, evidence of a positive eect of the nancial development
indicator, which is signicant at the conventional 5% level, is observed under the
system GMM estimation. In general, a one percent increase of the ratio of pri-
vate sector credit to GDP is found to be associated with a two percent increase of
the growth rate of per capita GDP. In comparison, limited evidence of a signi-
cant impact on output growth of democracy, or its interaction term with nancial
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development, is observed in this chapter.
Based on such ndings, this study conjectures that, nancial development per
se is capable of exerting a signicant and positive impact on domestic economic
growth. The growth-enhancing eect of the development of nancial sector does
not require the condition of democracy. For policymakers, improving the domestic










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.2: List of Countries
Albania D.R. of the Congo Latvia* Saint Lucia
Algeria Denmark* Lebanon Sao Tome and Principe
Angola Djibouti Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Antigua and Barbuda Dominica Liberia Senegal
Argentina Dominican Republic Lithuania* Serbia
Armenia Ecuador Luxembourg* Seychelles
Australia* Egypt Madagascar Sierra Leone
Austria* El Salvador Malawi Singapore*
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Slovakia*
Bahamas Estonia* Maldives Slovenia*
Bahrain Ethiopia Mali South Africa
Bangladesh Fiji Malta* Spain*
Barbados Finland* Mauritania Sri Lanka
Belarus France* Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium* Gabon Mexico Sudan
Belize Gambia Mongolia Suriname
Benin Georgia Montenegro Swaziland
Bhutan Germany* Morocco Sweden*
Bolivia Ghana Mozambique Switzerland*
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece* Myanmar Syrian Arab Republic
Botswana Grenada Namibia Taiwan Province*
Brazil Guatemala Nepal Tajikistan
Brunei Darussalam Guinea Netherlands* TFYR of Macedonia
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau New Zealand* Thailand
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Togo
Burundi Honduras Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Cabo Verde Hungary Nigeria Tunisia
Cambodia Iceland* Norway* Turkey
Cameroon India Oman Turkmenistan
Canada* Indonesia Pakistan U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland
Central African Republic Iran (Islamic Republic of) Panama Uganda
Chad Iraq Paraguay Ukraine
Chile Ireland* Peru United Arab Emirates
China Israel* Philippines United Kingdom*
China, Hong Kong SAR* Italy* Poland United States*
Colombia Jamaica Portugal* Uruguay
Comoros Japan* Qatar Uzbekistan
Congo Jordan Republic of Korea* Venezuela
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Republic of Moldova Viet Nam
Cte d'Ivoire Kenya Romania Yemen
Croatia Kuwait Russian Federation Zambia
Cyprus* Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Czech Republic* Lao People's DR Saint Kitts and Nevis























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.4: Regression results: Solow Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS WG DIF-GMM SYS-GMM DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.033*** -0.155*** -0.195*** -0.039*** -0.285*** -0.034***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.051) (0.010) (0.060) (0.012)
INVEST 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.140*** 0.073** 0.127***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.029) (0.021) (0.033) (0.024)
POP -0.054*** -0.023 -0.014 -0.094*** -0.003 -0.069***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.023)
Constant 0.475*** 1.564*** 0.000 0.000
(0.066) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 1482 1482 1307 1482 1307 1482
Countries 169 169 169 169 169 169
No. of IVs 144 172 114 142
AR(1) 0.004 0.001 0.025 0.001
AR(2) 0.022 0.005 0.064 0.005
Hansen test 0.126 0.334 0.083 0.061
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. The dependent
variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time dummies are included in all columns.
Two-step GMM estimator is used with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors.
AR(1) and AR(2) tests examine serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of order
1 and 2. p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) are reported in the table. Hansen test examines
over-identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen test are reported in the table. The lag
selection method is applied in restricting the number of GMM instruments.
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Table A3.5: Regression Results: Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.119***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028)
INVEST 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.104** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.031)
HC 0.097 0.116* 0.128** 0.130**
(0.065) (0.061) (0.058) (0.064)
POP -0.044 -0.033 -0.020 -0.017
(0.039) (0.043) (0.037) (0.043)
GOV -0.089* -0.071* -0.071 -0.075*
(0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040)
TRADE 0.058* 0.071 0.070** 0.062
(0.034) (0.045) (0.033) (0.038)
INF 0.107 0.003 0.054 0.001

















Constant 0.000 0.000 0.972*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.000)
Obs 852 880 853 881
Countries 103 107 103 107
No. of IVs 93 102 91 100
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.095 0.059 0.090 0.058
Hansen test 0.139 0.150 0.160 0.192
No. of PCs 83 92 81 90
PCA R2 0.855 0.856 0.850 0.854
KMO 0.896 0.890 0.886 0.884
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. The
dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time dummies
are included in all columns. Two-step GMM estimator is used with Wind-
meijer (2005) corrected standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) tests examine
serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of order 1 and 2. p-values
of AR(1) and AR(2) are reported in the table. Hansen test examines over-
identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen test are reported in the table.
PCA R2 is the part of the variance explained by the principal components.
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures the sampling adequacy of principal
components.
110
Table A3.6: Testing Nonlinearity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP(-1) -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.115*** -0.132***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
INVEST 0.126*** 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.155***
(0.027) (0.038) (0.029) (0.037)
HC 0.076* 0.074* 0.063 0.088**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044)
POP -0.062** -0.063** -0.069** -0.048
(0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029)
GOV -0.087* -0.072 -0.103** -0.109**
(0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049)
TRADE 0.077** 0.055* 0.071* 0.055*
(0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033)
INF 0.100 0.069 0.088 0.077
(0.061) (0.070) (0.072) (0.087)
FINDEV1 0.018** 0.046 0.022** 0.033
(0.008) (0.039) (0.010) (0.049)
POLITY2 -0.054 -0.05 -0.48 -0.404
(0.083) (0.079) (0.378) (0.532)
FINDEV1*POLITY2 0.015 0.001 -0.012 -0.01





Constant 0.000 1.204*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.255) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs 1121 1121 1121 1121
Countries 134 134 134 134
No. of IVs 88 96 91 100
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.083 0.037 0.088 0.050
Hansen test 0.106 0.045 0.130 0.117
No. of PCs 78 86 81 90
PCA R2 0.856 0.864 0.863 0.873
KMO 0.925 0.908 0.919 0.898
Notes: *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. The
dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. Time dummies
are included in all columns. Two-step GMM estimator is used with Wind-
meijer (2005) corrected standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) tests examine
serial correlation in the rst-dierenced errors of order 1 and 2. p-values
of AR(1) and AR(2) are reported in the table. Hansen test examines over-
identifying restrictions. p-values of Hansen test are reported in the table.
PCA R2 is the part of the variance explained by the principal components.









A long standing question in growth economics concerns whether there is any eco-
nomic gains from nancial development. Inspired by Loayza (1994) and Islam
(1995), one strand of studies on the nance-growth nexus take advantage of the
recent sophisticated dynamic panel modelling frameworks in their empirical in-
vestigation. For its benets in avoiding the endogeneity problem and mitigating
the omitted variable bias, panel data estimation is also employed in the preceding
chapter of this thesis in which we observed a signicant and positive growth eect
of nancial development.
However, concerns over the standard panel estimation framework have arisen in
the recent literature. First, as suggested by Temple (1999), Durlauf et al. (2005),
Eberhardt and Teal (2011) and Pesaran (2015), pooling a set of countries with
dierent economic or institutional conditions is quite typical in the previous growth
research. Nevertheless, neglecting the heterogeneity across countries could lead to
misleading inferences as the panel estimation may suer from inuential outliers.
Besides, as highlighted by Pesaran and Smith (1995), if the slope coecients dier
across nations, the homogeneous panel estimators are likely to produce inconsistent
estimates. In the context of the nance-growth relationship, the method of pooling
of heterogeneous economies, which is adopted in Chapter 3, might also result in an
incorrect conclusion on the growth eect of nance. Second, recent growth studies,
Eberhardt and Teal (2011) for example, have paid attention to the distorting
eect of the cross-section dependence issue. Typically, Phillips and Sul (2003) and
Andrews (2005) emphasised that, ignoring the impact of cross-section correlation,
as in the previous chapter of this thesis, could yield seriously biased estimates.
Therefore, given the macroeconomic linkages and common shocks, recent nancial
crisis for instance, it is important to account for the potential eect of cross-section
dependence on identifying the nance-growth nexus.
Given the technical concerns over the standard panel data estimation which we
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essentially applied in the previous chapter, this chapter re-visits the relationship
between nancial development and growth based on a balanced panel dataset of
countries. The originality of this study arises from several aspects. First, we
identify the long-run eect of nancial development on economic performance by
employing recently developed methods which have signicant bearings on how we
could model empirically the nance-growth nexus. Specically, the heterogeneous
panel estimation methods, including autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and
cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) models, are
adopted to account for the issues of slope heterogeneity and error cross-country
dependence. A potential nonlinear eect of nancial development is also controlled
for under both estimation approaches.
Second, we obtain a large panel dataset for 67 countries spanning 37 years over
the period 1971 to 2007 and annual observations are directly utilized in the het-
erogeneous panel estimation. Such a procedure is distinct from the data averaging
process we had in Chapter 3. Noticeably, the procedure of data averaging over
ve-year intervals is primarily conducted for the purpose of smoothing business
cycle uctuations. However, albeit standard, data averaging over ve-year inter-
vals is arbitrary in essence and is likely to induce a loss of information. Also, the
eectiveness of elimination of the business cycle uctuations is often questioned.
(Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Cavalcanti et al., 2015) To fully exploit the dynam-
ics in the nance-growth relationship that may be hidden in the data averaging
process, direct usage of the annual observations is therefore applied in this chapter.
The third originality is to examine whether the eect of nancial development
on economic performance diers for the countries with distinct democratic institu-
tions. Specically, we split the sample into two sub-samples, namely, democracy
and non-democracy sub-samples, to investigate if countries being democracies ben-
et or lose more from nancial development than those being non-democracies.
The estimation result in the full sample (67 countries) suggests that the eect
on the long-term economic performance of nancial development is signicant and
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positive after accounting for cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-country
dependence. Some evidence of a nonlinear relationship between nancial develop-
ment and output performance is also observed in the full sample estimation, which
implies a potential detrimental eect of nancial sector once a level of nancial
development has been achieved. Meanwhile, based on the sub-sample estimation
results, the long-run eect of nancial development is found to be benecial and
statistically signicant in the 29 non-democratic nations. For the 38 democratic
nations, however, such an eect is insignicant.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 examines
the issues of cross-country heterogeneity, cross-country dependence and nonlinear-
ity. As stressed in the previous literature, these three issues have become new
challenges in the estimation of the relationship between nancial development
and output performance. Section 4.3 introduces heterogeneous panel estimation
methodology. Empirical models used will also be discussed in this section. Section
4.4 provides a data description. Regression results for the full sample and two




As Durlauf et al. (2005) argued, strong homogeneity in the cross-country growth
process is normally assumed in the existing empirical growth literature. For in-
stance, all slope coecients are frequently constrained to be identical while inter-
cepts are allowed to dier across countries in studies using a xed eect speci-
cation. In other words, cross-country heterogeneity is limited as the possibility of
some slope coecients being dierent over the cross-sectional units is commonly
ignored.
Such practice, which restricts the degree of cross-country heterogeneity, has
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obviously raised concerns in the current growth empirics. Pesaran and Smith
(1995) highlighted the potentially inconsistent and misleading estimates of aver-
age values of parameter values considering a substantial degree of cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the growth model. Lee et al. (1997) contended that conven-
tional methods which impose strong homogeneity could lead to biases based on
the evidence of universal heterogeneity in growth rates and speed of convergence
for 102 economies worldwide. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf et al. (2005)
stressed that countries are essentially complex heterogeneous systems and ques-
tioned the appropriateness of a strong assumption of parameter homogeneity in
previous growth studies. Luintel and Khan (1999) also suggested that the homo-
geneity of slope coecients is unlikely to hold given the dierent stages of industrial
development in various nations.
At the same time, it is worth noting that a large part of nance-growth lit-
erature commonly conducts estimations under the strong assumption of a cross-
country homogeneity on the role of nancial development on output performance.
However, empirical evidence from several nance-growth studies have shed doubts
on such a method. For instance, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), Huang and Lin
(2009), and Rioja and Valev (2004b) collectively found that the growth-enhancing
eect of nancial system development is more signicant in poor countries than
in rich ones. Aghion et al. (2005) argued a declining inuence of nancial de-
velopment on economic performance as nations become wealthier. In research on
European economies, Masten et al. (2008) showed that the positive impact of
development of domestic nancial sector on output performance is smaller in de-
veloped countries than in developing ones. All of the above therefore suggests that
the potential cross-country heterogeneity on the role of nancial development on
economic performance should be addressed.
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4.2.2 Cross-Country Dependence
As stated by Eberhardt and Teal (2011), various seminal growth studies using
standard econometric approaches, including Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995),
and Caselli et al. (1996), generally assume errors to be cross-sectionally indepen-
dent. In particular, such a phenomenon, as argued by Phillips and Moon (1999), is
largely due to diculties in characterizing and modelling cross-section dependence.
However, various recent growth studies doubt whether the assumption of cross-
country independence is likely to hold. Typically, it is widely accepted nowadays
that a shock which aects one country may also aect others with Westerlund and
Edgerton (2008) arguing that \cross-sectional dependencies are likely to be rule
rather than the exception" in the context of macroeconomic analysis. Eberhardt
and Teal (2011), Pesaran (2015), and Cavalcanti et al. (2015) collectively ad-
mitted that the potential cross-sectional dependence could be salient considering
the high degree of macroeconomic linkages from history, geography, globalization,
and common shocks. Building on this, Monte Carlo experiments conducted by
Pesaran (2006) highlighted substantial bias and size distortions if ignoring the
potential cross-sectional dependence. Furthermore, Bhattacharya et al. (2016)
pointed out that only a small improvement in eciency can be expected from
panel estimators, relative to a single time-series, if the cross-sectional dependence
is not properly addressed.
Such doubts on the appropriateness of the conventional assumption of cross-
section independence naturally lead to questions regarding the standard panel
econometric approaches, which have been largely applied in the previous nance-
growth studies. In particular, Cavalcanti et al. (2015) suggested that taking into
account the country-specic observed characteristics alone does not ensure error
cross-sectional independence. In the context of the nance-growth nexus, ignoring
the issue of cross-country dependence could result in biased estimates and incorrect
inference for the eect of nancial development on economic performance. As
implied by Eberhardt and Teal (2011) and Dogan and Aslan (2017), given the
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international socioeconomic linkages, error cross-sectional dependence should be
considered via using recent developments in estimation techniques to obtain more
accurate policy implications for sample countries.
4.2.3 Nonlinearity
A growing number of studies suggest the existence of a nonlinear eect of nan-
cial development on economic growth. Recent evidence of this nonlinearity is
summarised in Table A4.1 in the appendix. For instance, with a sample of 48
nations from 1976 to 2001, Shen and Lee (2006) found that the relationship be-
tween nancial development and output growth to be inverse U-shaped. Based on
their analyses, a high level of nancial development could be a drag on economic
growth past a certain point. Such a nonlinear eect is also observed in Masten et
al. (2008). With a sample of 31 European countries for the period 1996 to 2004,
these authors argued that the benecial eect of nance on growth starts vanishing
once a certain level of nancial development is achieved. More recent evidence,
certain authors, including Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Law and Singh (2014),
Beck et al. (2014), Arcand et al. (2015), Cournede and Denk (2015), and Alexiou
et al. (2018), upheld a nonlinear eect. Despite the dierences in samples and
econometric approaches, these studies collectively showed that nancial develop-
ment promotes output growth only at low levels of nancial development. Once
a certain threshold is reached, the impact on economic growth becomes negative.
Some also attempted to quantify the threshold for the so-called \too much nance"
eect. Based on the estimates of Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Law and Singh
(2014), and Arcand et al. (2015), such a threhold is reached when private sector
credit around 90% to 100% of GDP.
Various reasons have been proposed to support this nding. The rst is the
suboptimal allocation of talents. In general, it is widely believed that the nan-
cial sector tends to extract excessively high informational rents and attract too
much talent from other sectors as it grows. Without sucient skilled workers in
118
productive industries, the economy suers due to the allocative ineciency and -
nancial sector expansion as a whole. (Tobin, 1984; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012)
The second is the productivity frontier with Aghion et al. (2005) stating that the
growth-enhancing role of nancial development might help countries to catch up
to the productivity frontier. However, only a limited eect of nancial develop-
ment would be evident if countries have reached the frontier. The third focuses
on the types of loans issued by the nancial sector. Beck et al. (2014) highlighted
that the important benecial eect of nancial development essentially comes from
enterprise rather than household credit. As any nancial sector expansion could
potentially be driven by increases in the volume of household lending, a higher level
of nancial development could result in speculative bubbles instead of productive
asset investment, thus lowering economic growth. (Beck et al., 2014)
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 ARDL Model
Following Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran (2015), a heterogeneous panel data
approach, i.e. panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, is initially
applied to account for potential cross-country heterogeneity in this study.
The standard ARDL model (Yt = f(Yt 1; Xt; Xt 1) facilitates dierent dynam-
ics across countries. Typically, distinct from the partial adjustment model (PAM)
(Yt = f(Yt 1; Xt)) used in a strand of growth studies, such as, Islam (1995) and
Caselli et al. (1996), this ARDL specication does not impose a zero coecient
on Xt 1 and hence is recommended as a more general specication of dynamics by
Eberhardt and Teal (2011). At the same time, the panel ARDL approach is valid
irrespective of whether the underlying variables are I(0) or I(1) or a mixture of
the two in the context of the existence of cointegration. (Pesaran and Smith, 1995;
Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 1999) Moreover, the validity of the ARDL model is
ensured regardless of the exogeneity or otherwise of the regressors.
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The ECM representation of the panel ARDL model is frequently applied in
the growth literature given its estimation advantages. Specically, a distinction
between short-term and long-term behaviour can be identied in the ECM rep-
resentation. Besides, the error correction term and speed of adjustment for the
economy to the long-run equilibrium can be deduced. Also, one can easily in-
vestigate cointegration via the statistical signicance of the error correction term.
(Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015)
4.3.2 CS-ARDL Model
It is worth noting that the panel ARDL model generally assumes the errors to be
cross-sectionally independent. However, as discussed earlier, the potential error
cross-sectional dependence should be taken into consideration. Recent develop-
ments in the estimation techniques provide such an option. For this study, this
chapter follows Pesaran (2006), Chudik and Pesaran (2015), and Cavalcanti et
al. (2015), and addresses cross-country heterogeneity and cross-country depen-
dence by employing the cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag
(CS-ARDL) model.
In essence, the CS-ARDL model augments the ARDL model with a linear
combination of the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variables and of all
regressors, which aims to capture the cross-sectional correlation in the error term.
Typically, as shown by Chudik and Pesaran (2015), both mean group (MG) and
pooled mean group (PMG) estimators can be used in the estimation of the CS-
ARDL model. Of course, the time-dimension (T) needs to be large enough so that
the model can be estimated for each cross-country unit. Also, a sucient number
of lagged cross-section averages should be included to ensure the validity of these
estimators.
The mean group (MG) estimator initially requires estimating time series equa-
tions for each country separately. The coecients across countries can then be
computed as the unweighted means of the estimated coecients. Pesaran and
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Smith (1995) suggested that the MG estimator provides consistent estimates of
the average of the parameters given a suciently large time-series dimension. At
the same time, it is worth noting that the MG estimator does not impose any re-
strictions on the cross-sectional parameters and ignores the possibility that some
parameters can be the same across countries. Given the fact that all intercepts and
coecients can dier freely, a maximum degree of heterogeneity could be reached
via this technique. However, the shortcomings of such an approach are quite ap-
parent. Although consistent, the MG estimator is likely to be inecient for a
small cross-country dimension (N). Also, as suggested by Arnold et al. (2011) and
Samargandi et al. (2015), this estimator is sensitive to any country outliers which
may aect the averages of the country coecients severely.
An alternative method is the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator proposed
by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). In particular, this PMG approach is widely
applied in recent empirical growth studies, such as, Loayza and Ranciere (2006),
Arnold et al. (2011), Samargandi et al. (2015), and Cavalcanti et al. (2015),
largely due to it being an intermediate routine between the averaging and pooling
methods of estimation. Specically, a two-step procedure is applied. First, the
long-term slope coecients are estimated jointly across countries via a concen-
trated maximum likelihood procedure. Second, given the estimates of the long-
term slope coecients, intercepts, short-term coecients, the speed of adjustment,
and error variances are estimated through maximum likelihood on a county-by-
country basis. Such an approach essentially restricts the long-term slope coe-
cients to be homogeneous over the cross-sections, but otherwise allows for hetero-
geneity. Given a large cross-country dimension, this PMG approach also provides
consistent estimates of the mean of the short-term coecients across countries by
averaging individual country coecients. (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Samargandi
et al., 2015)
It is worth noting here that several conditions should be required to ensure the
validity of the PMG estimator. (Samargandi et al.,2015; Cavalvanti et al., 2015)
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First, there must exist a long-term relationship among the variables of interest.
Such a condition can be examined via a negative and signicant coecient on the
error correction term. Second, the dynamic specication of the model should be
suciently augmented so that the regressors can be treated as weakly exogenous.
Third, the resulting residuals from the error correction model must be serially
uncorrelated.
4.3.3 Method Selection
Obviously, the selection between MG and PMG approaches for the growth re-
gression analysis rests on whether homogeneous slopes can be imposed for the
estimated long-term parameters. Hence, it essentially involves a trade-o between
consistency and eciency. Specically, given the invalid homogeneous restrictions,
the restricted estimators are inconsistent. For instance, if the long-term coecients
are, in fact, not equal across countries, the MG estimates of the mean of long-term
coecients are consistent while the PMG estimates are inconsistent. However,
if the homogeneous restrictions are valid, estimators which impose cross-country
constraints dominate the heterogeneous ones in terms of eciency. For example,
when the long-run coecients are the same for individual countries, both MG and
PMG estimates are consistent, but only the latter are ecient. (Arnold et al.,
2011; Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Samargandi et al., 2015) However, as empha-
sized in Arnold et al. (2011), the hypothesis of homogeneity of long-run parameters
cannot be treated as a given. Instead, such a hypothesis should be tested via a
standard Hausman test. If the null of this test is not rejected, the PMG estimator
is recommended on eciency grounds.
Often the PMG approach is regarded as best available compromise for consis-
tency and eciency. (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Arnold et al., 2011; Samargandi
et al.,2015; Cavalcanti et al., 2015). Such an approach could also be appropriate in
the context of the nance-growth nexus. On the one hand, various previous stud-
ies, including Loayza and Ranciere (2006), Arnold et al. (2011), and Samargandi
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et al. (2015), have implied that there is a homogeneous long-term relationship
between nancial development and economic performance across countries. Short-
term adjustment, on the other hand, could be aected by country-specic mon-
etary policies, laws and regulations, as well as macroeconomic fundamentals and
hence is expected to be subject to a substantial degree of heterogeneity. (Loayza
and Ranciere, 2006; Arnold et al., 2011; Samargandi et al., 2015; Cavalcanti et al.,
2015).
4.3.4 Empirical Model
The empirical models used for this study are essentially based on the ARDL and
CS-ARDL model specications. We initially employ the error correction form of
the ARDL model:








ijxi;t j + "it (4.1)
where yit is the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP for country i at year
t. xit is a 4  1 vector of explanatory variables, which are the logarithm of do-
mestic investment over GDP (INVEST), logarithm of secondary school enrollment
rate (SSE) from Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive1, logarithm of corrected
population growth rate (POP), logarithm of private credit by nancial institutions
to GDP (FINDEV) and the squared term of the nancial development measure
((FINDEV)^2) In particular, the long-run and short-run behaviors are distin-
guished in equation (4.1). Specically, i represents the long-term equilibrium
relationship between xit and yit while ij and ij capture the short-term dynam-
ics between variables. i implies the speed of convergence of the economy to the
long-term equilibrium. Meanwhile, terms in parentheses represent the candidate
cointegrating relationship that we aim to identify for the panel estimation.
1We thank Norman Lin of Edinburgh University for sharing his series.
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As suggested by, the traditional panel ARDL approach accounts for slope het-
erogeneity and dierent order of integration in variables, and can be applied re-
gardless of whether the regressors are exogenous or not. However, Phillips and Sul
(2003) highlighted the potential misleading estimates if ignoring the error cross-
section correlation. Following Pesaran (2006), Chudik et al. (2013) and Eberhardt
and Presbitero (2015), we then move to the panel CS-ARDL approach where cross-
sectional averages of independent variables, the dependent variables, and a series
of their lag values are added to account for the cross-sectional correlation in the
error term. The error correction form of this CS-ARDL model can be shown as:2





















where yt and xt are the simple cross-section averages of yit and xit. Noticeably,
we distinguish the short-term and long-term behaviors of the cross-sectional cor-
relation in equation (4.2). Following Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), only the
level parts of cross-sectional averages are included in the long-term equilibrium
relationship in the parentheses. Meanwhile, the long-run coecients between yit
and xit, that is, i, and the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium,
that is, i, are the key coecients of economic interest in the following regression
analysis.3
4.4 Data Description
As discussed earlier, the ARDL and CS-ARDL models are selected for this study.
As shown in Loayza and Ranciere (2006) and Cavalcanti et al. (2015), these ap-
2Full derivation of the error correction forms of both models can be found in the appendix.
3We also report the short-run coecients (ij and ij .) in our regressions. However, as it is
a common practice as in Loayza and Ranciere (2006), Chudik et al. (2013) and Eberhardt and
Presbitero (2015), our focus is on i and i.
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proaches also enable the utilization of annual data instead of averaging. To be
specic, the same data source as in the previous chapter is used for measures of
economic performance and nancial development. Denitions and sources of all
variables can be found in Table A4.2 in the appendix. These variables in the es-
timation, including measures of economic performance and nancial development,
uctuate instead of being stable over years. Hence, it is possible to employ annual
data under the ARDL and CS-ARDL model frameworks.
Of course, suciently large time series and cross-sectional dimensions are nor-
mally required to allow for cross-sectional slope heterogeneity and residual cross-
sectional dependence. (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Arnold et al., 2011; Samar-
gandi et al., 2015; Cavalcanti et al., 2015) Given such conditions, only countries
for which there are 37 consecutive observations on nancial development and real
per capita GDP series available are used in the analysis. As a result, the dataset is
balanced, covering 67 countries over the period 1971 to 2007. The list of countries
included can be found in Table A4.3.
Here, the dichotomous democracy indices of Cheibub et al. (2010) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2014) are matched for these nations in the sample. A country is
dened as a democracy if both two measures have a value of 1 for at least 19
out of 37 years over the sample period. Otherwise, a non-democracy is identied
from 1971 to 2007. Accordingly, 38 nations were identied as democracies with
the other 29 being non-democracies.
Table 4.1 below displays the summary statistics of variables for the whole sam-
ple and the sub-samples. From Table 4.1, the average annual growth rate of real
per capita output is 1.6% for all 67 nations in the sample period. By compari-
son, 38 democratic nations have enjoyed a relatively high average output growth
rate. The average economic growth rate is merely 0.9% for the non-democratic
economies. In terms of the level of per capita output, the democratic sub-sample
largely outperformed the non-democratic sub-sample. In the meantime, the vari-
ation of the per capita output level, on average during the period 1971 to 2010, is
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relatively close for the whole sample and for the two individual sub-samples.
Also, it is worth noting that democratic sub-sample has experienced high do-
mestic investment and secondary school enrollment rates. The average population
growth rate of the 29 non-democratic economies is relatively higher than that of
the 38 democracies. In addition, despite the fact that the levels of nancial devel-
opment vary dramatically within the 38 democratic nations, the average private
credit indicator is twice as large as that of non-democracy sub-sample.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Whole Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 2,412 0.016 0.046 -0.298 0.314
GDP 2,479 11679.220 12742.030 518.180 94431.080
INVEST 2,479 0.198 0.093 0.006 0.546
SSE 2,479 0.056 0.031 0.001 0.166
POP 2,479 0.069 0.011 0.041 0.115
FINDEV 2,479 0.373 0.353 0.011 1.981
Panel B: Democracy Sub-sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 1,368 0.022 0.036 -0.161 0.198
GDP 1,406 16152.180 12180.800 1148.387 58643.040
INVEST 1,406 0.229 0.080 0.049 0.516
SSE 1,406 0.068 0.027 0.007 0.166
POP 1,406 0.064 0.009 0.047 0.087
FINDEV 1,406 0.501 0.391 0.033 1.981
Panel C: Non-democracy Sub-sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 1,044 0.009 0.056 -0.298 0.314
GDP 1,073 5818.103 10964.380 518.180 94431.080
INVEST 1,073 0.157 0.094 0.006 0.546
SSE 1,073 0.040 0.028 0.001 0.126
POP 1,073 0.076 0.009 0.041 0.115
FINDEV 1,073 0.205 0.194 0.011 1.552
Notes: Summary statistics are for original annual variables before
log transformations.
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Table 4.2 shows the correlation analysis for the whole sample and two sub-
samples. Noticeably, real per capita GDP is highly positively related to the do-
mestic investment, human capital and nancial development measures. While the
correlation between the growth rate of population and average output is highly
negative. For the non-democractic countries, a higher level of per capita output
is associated with a higher rate of growth of per capita output. Also, the nan-
cial development indicator is positively associated with the growth rate of average
output for both sub-samples.
Table 4.2: Correlation Analysis
Panel A: Whole Sample
GROWTH GDP INVEST SSE POP FINDEV
GROWTH 1.000
GDP 0.129 1.000
INVEST 0.211 0.569 1.000
SSE 0.154 0.644 0.376 1.000
POP -0.143 -0.593 -0.342 -0.534 1.000
FINDEV 0.121 0.696 0.479 0.539 -0.533 1.000
Panel B: Democracy Sub-sample
GROWTH GDP INVEST SSE POP FINDEV
GROWTH 1.000
GDP -0.001 1.000
INVEST 0.238 0.513 1.000
SSE 0.120 0.358 0.256 1.000
POP -0.084 -0.614 -0.267 -0.530 1.000
FINDEV 0.048 0.637 0.454 0.352 -0.513 1.000
Panel C: Non-democracy Sub-sample
GROWTH GDP INVEST SSE POP FINDEV
GROWTH 1.000
GDP 0.091 1.000
INVEST 0.134 0.411 1.000
SSE 0.089 0.624 0.213 1.000
POP -0.062 -0.078 -0.035 -0.275 1.000
FINDEV 0.057 0.494 0.282 0.435 -0.100 1.000




4.5.1 Panel Unit Root Testing
As described earlier, the panel ARDL approach is valid irrespective of whether
the underlying variables are I(0) or I(1), or a mixture of the two. Hence, it is
important to examine the time series properties of these. Two panel unit root tests,
i.e. Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) and the Pesaran (2007) cross-sectionally
augmented IPS (CIPS) tests, are conducted here.
The IPS test generally allows for heterogeneous autoregressive parameters for
each panel. All panels have a unit root under the null hypothesis of the IPS
test. Once rejecting the null, it is indicated that a nonzero fraction of panels
is stationary. However, as stated by Cavalcanti et al. (2015) and Eberhardt and
Presbitero (2015), the presence of cross sectional dependence threatens the validity
of standard panel unit root tests. Hence, we also apply the CIPS test proposed by
Pesaran (2007). In particular, this panel unit root test allows for heterogeneous
unit root processes via an augmented ADF regressions for each country with cross
section averages.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the results of IPS and CIPS tests for GDP, INVEST,
HC, POP, FINDEV, and a square term of FINDEV for the whole sample. As
shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, for each lag equal to 1, 2, and 3, two scenarios;
namely, including both an intercept and a linear trend, and including only an
intercept are considered in the testing. From both tables, the GDP series can
be identied as a I(1) series while SSE is generally a I(0) series. Some mixed
results are observed on the time series properties for the variables in their level
values. However, the hypothesis of a panel unit root process is rejected after rst-
dierencing using both IPS and CIPS tests. As a result, the validity of panel
ARDL approach is guaranteed as the estimated model does not contain a I(2)
series. In particular, same validities are also conrmed in both democratic and
non-democratic sub-samples after applying two panel unit root tests.
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Table 4.3: Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) IPS Test: Whole Sample
With an intercept and a linear trend
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP  1:362* 0:067  1:379 1
INVESTMENT  3:548***  1:247  1:107 1
SSE  3:482***  5:182***  6:182*** 0
POP  35:700*** 4:182  5:111*** 1
FINDEV  3:022**  0:688  2:515*** 1
(FINDEV)^2  4:293***  2:911***  4:320*** 0
With an intercept
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP 6:341 7:963 6:848 1
INVESTMENT  4:940***  2:752***  2:459*** 0
SSE  4:206***  4:091***  4:831*** 0
POP  19:769*** 7:369  0:744 1
FINDEV  0:979 0:200  0:574 1
(FINDEV)^2  4:755***  4:276***  4:791*** 0
D(GDP)  21:765***  13:442***  12:520*** 0
D(INVESTMENT)  29:767***  20:164***  15:902*** 0
D(SSE)  11:120***  8:575***  10:410*** 0
D(POP)  35:849***  6:943***  6:183*** 0
D(FINDEV)  20:458***  13:319***  11:105*** 0
D[(FINDEV)^2]  21:358***  14:794***  12:541*** 0
Notes: The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit roots. *** signicant
at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
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Table 4.4: Pesaran (2007) CIPS Test: Whole Sample
With an intercept and a linear trend
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP  3:759* 0:504  0:162 1
INVESTMENT  5:619***  2:542***  1:572* 0
SSE  1:657**  1:430*  1:348* 0
POP  24:485*** 5:310  0:970*** 1
FINDEV  2:585*** 0:364  0:500 1
(FINDEV)^2  3:224***  0:522 0:161 1
With an intercept
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP  1:435* 1:193 0:550 1
INVESTMENT  3:789***  0:701 0:064 1
SSE  4:290***  5:184***  4:074*** 0
POP  26:334*** 1:485  5:311*** 1
FINDEV  3:513***  1:154  1:885** 1
(FINDEV)^2  2:830***  0:924  0:143 1
D(GDP)  19:408***  11:069***  9:154*** 0
D(INVESTMENT)  25:407***  17:238***  13:103*** 0
D(SSE)  10:285***  7:182***  7:301*** 0
D(POP)  24:659***  4:337***  3:127*** 0
D(FINDEV)  15:268***  9:775***  7:489*** 0
D[(FINDEV)^2]  16:242***  11:433***  8:751*** 0
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series is a unit root. Cross-section
dependence is assumed to be in form of a single unobserved common factor.
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
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4.5.2 Full Sample Estimates
Table 4.5 presents results derived from the ECM specication for the full sample.
Following Samargandi et al. (2015), a quadratic term of the nancial development
indicator is included to capture the potential nonlinear association between nan-
cial development and economic performance. As stated earlier, it is likely that
the MG estimator is sensitive to country outliers and inecient in a panel with
a small cross-country dimension. In comparison, the PMG estimator has been
regarded as a popular method in recent growth empirics given its compromise be-
tween consistency and eciency. As a result, the long-run coecients on economic
performance is achieved by the use of the PMG estimator in the table below and
those that follow.
The rst column in Table 4.5 shows the long-run estimates based on the ARDL
model. As mentioned by Loayza and Ranciere (2006), the determination of the lag
order of the ARDL model generally involves a tradeo between sucient length
and over-extension, given a limited time-series dimension. It is worth noting that
various scholars have applied dierent approaches for this lag selection. A number
of empirical studies impose a common lag structure for all the countries in the
sample. For instance, Chudik et al. (2013) investigated the long-term relationship
between growth, debt and ination for over 40 economies over the period 1965 to
2010. They used the same lag order for all variables in their ARDL estimation.
The same strategy of the common lag selection was also employed in Mohaddes
and Raissi (2014), who examined the ination-growth relationship using Indian
state level data from 1989 to 2013.
Other studies have argued that the lag order of the ARDL can be selected via
consistent information criterion. Specically, the application of the information
criterion is subject to a maximum lag on each of the regressors, which needs to
be decided initially by the researchers. In particular, Arnold et al. (2011) set a
maximum of 2 lags in their examination of speed of the convergence on an annual
panel of 21 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004. Cavalcanti et al. (2015), who
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Table 4.5: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eects on Economic Performance:
Whole Sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
VARIABLES
Long Run Equation
INVEST 0.756*** 0.304*** 0.527***
(0.054) (0.015) (0.025)
SSE 0.348*** 0.160*** 0.134***
(0.042) (0.022) (0.030)
POP -3.662*** -0.129** -1.574***
(0.324) (0.057) (0.139)
FINDEV -0.158** 0.031*** 0.071**
(0.064) (0.011) (0.029)
FINDEV^2 -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.017***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.038*** -0.127*** -0.074***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.022)
D(INVEST) 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
D(SSE) 0.030 0.030 -0.007
(0.029) (0.034) (0.044)
D(POP) 0.331 0.539 0.979**
(0.210) (0.402) (0.437)
D(FINDEV) -0.067* -0.147*** -0.103
(0.037) (0.053) (0.065)
D(FINDEV^2) -0.014 0.000 0.023
(0.015) (0.022) (0.031)
Constant 0.058*** 0.555*** 0.607***
(0.008) (0.107) (0.173)
Obs 2412 2345 2278
Pesaran CD 15.610 -0.455 -1.561
P-Value [0.000] [0.650] [0.119]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model
with the rst dierence of log real per capita as the
dependent variable. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; *
signicant at 10%.
132
studied the eect of commodity terms of trade on growth on a sample of annual
observations of 118 countries over the 1970 to 2007, also set a maximum of 2 lags
in their analysis. For this study, the latter approach is followed and the lag order
is selected via the BIC subject to a maximum lag of 2 on each of the explanatory
variables in the ARDL model. According to the BIC, ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) is
selected here, as depicted in the rst column of the table.
From Column 1, the coecient on the error correction term is statistically sig-
nicant at the 1% level with a negative sign. This nding suggests that the system
reverts to the long-run values following a shock, and thus there exists cointegration
among the variables. Also, per capita output is positively and signicantly related
to domestic investment and human capital, and negatively related to the corrected
rate of population growth. Such ndings are generally consistent with the theo-
retical expectations of the augmented Solow model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992). Meanwhile, the estimated coecients of both the nancial development
indicator and of its quadratic term turn out to be signicantly negative. Thus, it
is implied that the increase in the private credit ratio would lead to a decrease in
the long-turn real average output.
The validity of the PMG estimates in Column 1 is essentially based on the
assumption that the errors are cross-sectionally independent. In order to test such
an assumption, the cross-section dependence (CD) test was conducted. Specif-
ically, this test uses the correlation-coecients between the time-series for each
panel member. Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, the CD
statistic is standard normally distributed.4From the bottom of the column, the
null of cross-section independence in the error term is rejected at the conventional
signicance level. Clearly, failing to account for error cross-country dependence,
means that the accuracy of PMG estimates is generally questionable.
The CS-ARDL methodology is then employed, which essentially includes ad-
ditional lagged cross-sectional averages of the dependent variables and of all re-







j=i+1 ^ij , where ^ij is the
pairwise correlation between panel units.
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gressors into the estimation. A crucial step in the usage of the CS-ARDL model
is the selection of lag order for the cross-sectional averages. Typically, it is widely
accepted that the number of lagged cross-section averages should be sucient in
order to overcome the concerns on cross-sectional dependence of the residual. Pre-
vious studies, including Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Eberhardt and Presbitero
(2015), hinted at an augmentation with a number of integer(T 1=3) lagged cross-
section averages. Other studies, such as, Chudik et al. (2013), Mohaddes and
Raissi (2014), Cavalcanti et al. (2015), and El-Anshasy et al. (2015), collectively
set the number of the lagged cross-section averages not to exceed 3. As a result,
two scenarios are considered where the lag length of all averaged dependent and
explanatory variables are restricted to be 2 or 3.
The next two columns in Table 4.5 show the PMG estimates of these two CS-
ARDL model specications. Noticeably, from the bottom of both columns, the null
hypothesis of cross-section independence in the Pesaran CD test is not rejected.
It suggests that the cross-sectional dependence caused by common factors, such
as the oil crises in the 1970s and the recent global nancial crisis, have been ruled
out once augmenting the regression with either 2 or 3 extra lagged cross-sectional
averages of the dependent variables and the regressors. As issues of cross-country
heterogeneity and error cross-country dependence have been properly confronted,
the PMG estimates under the CS-ARDL model are therefore preferred in the
identication of the eect of nancial development on economic performance.
In both Columns 2 and 3, the estimated coecient of error correction term
is, again, negative and signicant at the 1% level. Under both specications, the
estimated coecients of INVEST, SSE, and POP are signicant with the expected
signs. The results show that a one percent increase in the proportion of domestic
investment over output is associated with an average increase in steady-state per
capita GDP of over 0.3 percent. Meanwhile, a one percent increase in the rate of
secondary school enrollment is associated with an average increase in steady-state
level of real per capita output by more than 0.1 percent. A positive and signicant
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eect of the level of nancial development on the level of output performance is
observed in both Columns 2 and 3. Meanwhile, the estimated coecient on the
quadratic term of nancial development indicator is negative and signicant at
the 1% level. Such a nding supports pervious empirics, including Shen and Lee
(2010), Arcand et al. (2015), and Alexiou et al. (2018). After controlling for
cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-country dependence, the relationship
between nancial development and economic performance is found to be bell-
shaped for the 69 countries over the period 1971 to 2007. Based on such a nding,
we argue that, more private credit raises output performance at low levels of
credit. However, high levels of private credit could exert a detrimental eect on
the long-run economic performance. In other words, there is a peak where the extra
private credit and a larger nancial sector starts to retard output performance. To
compute the estimate of such a peak of the bell-shaped relationship, the estimated
coecients in Table 4.5 are used. In particular, this point for private credit is
estimated to be about 150% of GDP.5Several examples can be listed from the
sample used here, where the country's nancial development level once exceeded
this gure. To start with, the ratio of private credit to GDP of both Malaysia
and Thailand reached 150% during the Asian nancial crisis of 1997 to 1998.
Meanwhile, taking the examples of Canada, Demark, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, where private credit grew steadily from the
early 2000s and exceeded 150% in 2007, the year before the global nancial crisis.
Another interesting example is Japan. During the period of its economic crisis
from late 1980s to 2007, Japan's private credit ratio never dropped below 1.5.
Noticeably, all these countries are democracies according to the binary democracy
indices employed earlier, with one exception of Malaysia.
5From Column 2, we set the partial derivative of GDP with respect to FINDEV equal to
zero: @GDP=@FINDEV = 0:031   0:078FINDEV = 0. So, FINDEV = 0:397. Using the
exponential function, the point estimate of private credit to GDP ratio is eFINDEV = e0:397 =
1:487. From Column 3, the private credit to GDP ratio is estimated to be 8.069. As we do not
have a ratio this big in our sample, nance's negative impact only takes eect outside of our
sample range according to Column 3.
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4.5.3 Sub-sample Estimates
As stated earlier, two sub-samples can be identied based on the annual value
of the binary democracy indices of Cheibub et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al.
(2014). Estimation results for the democratic and non-democratic sub-sample can
be found in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. In common, the rst columns of these
tables present PMG estimates based on the ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) model while the
last two display the estimates of the CS-ARDL model, where further 2 or 3 lags
of the cross-section averages of dependent and explanatory variables are added.
In Table 4.6, the coecient on the error correction term is always negative
and statistically signicant. Meanwhile, as expected, the estimated coecient of
domestic investment on average output turns out to be signicantly positive in
the long run, while that of corrected population growth rate is negative using both
ARDL and CS-ARDL approaches.
The PMG estimates in Table 4.6 show mixed results, especially on the measure
of nancial development. From rst two columns, the estimated eect of the level
of nancial development on long-term economic performance is positive and sta-
tistically signicant. However, it is worth noting that the null hypothesis of cross-
sectional independence under the Pesaran CD test is strictly rejected. Clearly,
without ruling out the eect of the common shocks across countries, panel esti-
mates in either column are not preferred. In Column 3, despite another rejection
of the null of the CD test, existence of error cross-section dependence is reduced
as the Pesaran CD statistic drops dramatically to around -2. Given a sum of three
lags of cross-sectional averages of the dependent variables and of the regressors
have been added, in our point of view, this column provides the most accurate
estimates of the long-term eects on output performance for the 38 democratic
economies in this sub-sample. From Column 3, the PMG estimate of domestic
nancial development on long-run economic performance is negative, but statisti-
cally insignicant. Further, from this table, the long-run estimate of squared term
of nancial development indicator is also insignicant; albeit positive.
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Table 4.6: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eects on Economic Performance:
Democracy Sub-sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
VARIABLES
Long Run Equation
INVEST 0.552*** 0.922*** 0.709***
(0.053) (0.134) (0.050)
SSE 0.219*** -0.446*** -0.632***
(0.042) (0.106) (0.074)
POP -1.225*** -6.414*** -1.877***
(0.234) (0.801) (0.198)
FINDEV 0.965** 1.914*** -0.031
(0.095) (0.260) (0.045)
FINDEV^2 0.333*** 0.737*** 0.018
(0.032) (0.106) (0.019)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.048*** -0.015* -0.051***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.020)
D(K) 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.091***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
D(SSE) 0.009 -0.025 0.016
(0.034) (0.042) (0.049)
D(POP) 0.098 0.069 0.621
(0.307) (0.386) (0.564)
D(FINDEV) -0.023 -0.059 0.032
(0.046) (0.064) (0.074)
D(FINDEV^2) -0.017 0.038 0.069
(0.023) (0.037) (0.042)
Constant 0.403*** 0.555*** 2.194***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.853)
Obs 1368 1330 1292
Pesaran CD 16.721 8.395 -2.482
P-Value [0.000] [0.000] [0.013]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model
with the rst dierence of log real per capita as the
dependent variable. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; *
signicant at 10%.
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Table 4.7 presents the estimates of the non-democracy sub-sample. Noticeably,
Column 1 reveals some evidence of a positive, but insignicant, eect of nancial
system development on long-term economic performance. However, after observing
the existence of error cross-section dependence, the CS-ARDL model specication
is the preferred approach as it takes account into both issues of cross-country
heterogeneity and error cross-section dependence.
Both Columns 2 and 3 suggest that the use of cross-section averages largely
reduces residual cross-section dependence. In particular, as the Pesaran CD test
statistics drop to around -0.5, no evidence of error cross-section dependence is
uncovered in these two columns. Therefore, concerns over the inuence of macroe-
conomic linkages and common shocks have been eliminated via augmenting the
ARDL regression with average terms of related variables. From last two columns,
the estimated eects on per capita output of physical capital investment and hu-
man capital are all statistically signicant with the expected signs under the CS-
ARDL approach. Also, the estimated coecient of private credit to GDP on the
long-term economic performance is signicantly positive in both columns. At the
same time, the PMG estimate of the squared term of the ratio of credit to private
sector over GDP also turns out to be signicantly positive at the conventional
signicance level.
From Tables 4.6 and 4.7, the PMG estimator yields a statistically signicant
and positive coecient of nancial development on the long-term economic per-
formance for the non-democractic economies. However, such a coecient is not
signicant for the democratic countries. Typically, cross-country heterogeneity
and error cross-section dependence have been controlled for using the CS-ARDL
specication in which a sucient number of lagged cross-section averages are in-
cluded. Also, no evidence is found for the existence of a nonlinear eect of nancial
development on economic performance in either sub-sample.
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Table 4.7: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eects on Economic Performance:
Non-democracy Sub-sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
VARIABLES
Long Run Equation
INVEST 0.494*** 0.247*** 0.192***
(0.041) (0.023) (0.013)
SSE 0.190*** 0.366*** 0.047*
(0.022) (0.048) (0.026)
POP -0.952*** -0.833*** 1.024***
(0.169) (0.172) (0.083)
FINDEV 0.126 0.584*** 0.482***
(0.083) (0.065) (0.058)
FINDEV^2 -0.019 0.103*** 0.126***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.070*** -0.114*** -0.174***
(0.021) (0.035) (0.067)
D(INVEST) 0.032* 0.043* 0.009
(0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
D(SSE) 0.064 0.084 0.125
(0.048) (0.053) (0.101)
D(POP) 0.361 0.792 0.518
(0.276) (0.581) (1.199)
D(FINDEV) -0.169*** -0.275*** -0.070
(0.055) (0.097) (0.160)
D(FINDEV^2) -0.034*** -0.053** -0.002
(0.014) (0.026) (0.047)
Constant 0.519*** 0.744*** -1.641***
(0.148) (0.229) (0.590)
Obs 1044 1015 986
Pesaran CD 2.110 -0.573 -0.426
P-Value [0.035] [0.567] [0.670]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model
with the rst dierence of log real per capita as the
dependent variable. Standard errors are in parenthe-




This study re-visits the relationship between nancial development and economic
performance by utilizing annual observations for 67 countries over the period 1971
to 2007. Typically, we note the fact that the assumptions of cross-country ho-
mogeneity and error cross-section independence in the previous macro panel data
estimation have been questioned over the past years. Various scholars, including
Durlauf et al. (2005) and Eberhardt and Teal (2011), stressed that the issues of
cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-section dependence which arise from
unobserved common factors, should be properly addressed in order to obtain ac-
curate results for policy guidance. Due to the conventional assumptions applied,
most existing panel empirics on the nance-growth nexus could be subject to
such problems. As a result, newly developed macro panel data techniques have
been employed into the examination of the eect of nancial development on the
long-term output performance. Firstly, considering the potential cross sectional
dependence in our panel time series, both IPS and CIP tests were applied to deter-
mine whether the variables investigated are non-stationary or not. Secondly, the
estimation method is focused on the PMG estimator, which restricts the long-term
slope coecients to be homogeneous over the cross-sections. As it has been widely
applied in recent growth empirics, this PMG estimator is normally regarded as
a best compromise for consistency and eciency in a macro panel. Thirdly, af-
ter detecting the evidence of error cross-section dependence, the CS-ARDL model
specication is preferred because of its ability to account for residual cross-sectional
dependence.
The main nding based on the whole sample is that the eect of the level of
nancial development, measured by the ratio of private credit of nancial institu-
tions to GDP, on the long-term output performance is found to be positive and
signicant after controlling for cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-country
dependence. Also, some evidence of a reverse U-shaped relationship between -
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nancial development and economic performance is observed for the 69 countries
over the period 1971 to 2007. In particular, the peak point for private credit is
estimated to be about 150% of GDP. Such a nding is generally consistent with
Shen and Lee (2006) and Arcand et al. (2015), which supported the existence of
a nonlinear impact on output performance of nancial system development.
Two sub-samples were constructed based on the binary democracy indices of
Cheibub et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). Based on the PMG estimates
under the CS-ARDL model, the signicantly positive eect of nancial develop-
ment is only found in the 29 non-democratic countries. For the other democratic
economies, such an eect is insignicant. In the meantime, the results fail to
provide further evidence of a nonlinear nance-growth relationship from two sub-
samples. As a result, it is suggested that the overall benecial impact on the
long-term economic performance of nancial development could be largely driven
by the non-democratic nations.
Despite the eorts in using recent heterogeneous panel estimation methods
with cross-section dependence, several aspects should be addressed for the further
improvement for this study. The rst is on the size of dataset we used. Due to
data constraints, the whole sample only covers 69 countries from 1971 to 2007.
Given a nite size of annual observations, concerns over the the error cross-section
dependence cannot be completely removed as we observed in Table 4.6. The
second is on the dichotomous democracy index. The employment of a democracy
index in binary form is doubtful considering its inability to accurately portray the
nuances of democracy in individual nations. (Jacob and Osang, 2015) Following
such ideas, the criteria set in the partition of democratic and non-democratic sub-
samples could be conceptually oversimplied.
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Appendix: ARDL and CS-ARDL Models
The standard panel ARDL (p; q; :::; q) model following Pesaran (2015) is:








ijxi;t j + "it (4.3)
where the number of countries i = 1; 2; :::; N ; the number of years t = 1; 2; :::; T . !i
are the xed eects, xit is a k 1 vector of regressors for country i, ij are scalars,
and %ij are k-dimensional coecient vectors. By assumption, "it are independently
distributed across i and t, with zero means, variances 2i , and are distributed inde-
pendently of the regressors xit. Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Johansen (1995)
stated that the long-term relationship exists only among integrated variables in
the context of cointegration. Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pe-
saran et al. (1999), however, suggested that the panel ARDL approach is valid
irrespective of whether the underlying variables are I(0) or I(1) or a mixture of
the two. Also, this method can be applied regardless of whether the regressors are
exogenous or not.
As suggested by Pesaran (2015) and Samargandi et al.(2015), the dynamic het-
erogeneous panel regression can be incorporated into the Error Correction Model
(ECM) using the ARDL technique. The ECM representation of the ARDL model
above can be then shown as:








ijxi;t j + "it (4.4)
where i =  (1  
Pp




j=0 %ij, meanwhile, ij =
 Ppl=j+1 il, and ij =  Pql=j+1 %il. Here, i is the error-correcting speed of
adjustment term. i represents the long-term equilibrium relationship between xit
and yit. Both ij and ij capture the short-term dynamics between variables.
Following Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015), the cross-sectionally
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augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) is the model employed here.
Starting with a standard panel ARDL (p; q; :::; q) model:








ijxi;t j + uit (4.5)
where all the notations are same as before except for uit, which is assumed to have
the multifactor error structure:
uit = 
0
ift + "it (4.6)
where ft is a vector of unobserved common shocks, and 
0
i is a matrix of country-
specic factor loadings. Noticeably, ft can be stationary and nonstationary as
suggested by Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata (2011) and are allowed to be
serially correlated and possibly correlated with regressors. By assumption, "it are
independently distributed across i and t, with zero means, variances 2i , and are
distributed independently of the regressors xit or the unobserved common factors.
Following the Common Correlated Eect (CCE) method of Pesaran (2006)
and Chudik and Pesaran (2015), equations (4.5) and (4.6) are averaged under the
assumption that slope coecients and regressors are uncorrelated and thus:










ft + "t (4.7)
where j = 0; 1; :::; p, yt j = N
 1PN
i=1 yi;t j, j = N
 1PN





i=1 xi;t j, %j = N
 1PN
i=1 %ij,  = N
 1PN
i=1 i, and "t = N
 1PN
i=1 "it.
Considering that the "it are assumed to be independently distributed across i
and t, "t tends to zero in root mean square error as N becomes large. As a result,
the cross-sectional correlation in uit is captured via a linear combination of the
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where, for some #i, i = #i(1 
Pp
j=1 j), i = #i(1 
Pq
j=0 %k), ij = #i(
Pp
l=j+1 l),
and &ij = #i(
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The ECM representation of the panel CS-ARDL is:





















where i = !i   #i!, 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As an essential component of the modern economy, the role of nance in the
socioeconomic progress has attracted massive attention over the last century. In
particular, the relationship between nancial development and economic perfor-
mance has been listed among the most hotly debated topics among social scientists
and policy makers.
From a theoretical point of view, higher levels of development of nancial in-
stitutions and markets indicate better functioning of the nancial sector in infor-
mation production, corporate governance, risk diversication, saving mobilization,
transaction facilitation etc. Via these improved functions, nancial development is
normally expected to be capable of stimulating the long-term output performance.
At the same time, since the seminal contributions of King and Levine (1993a, b) in
the early 1990s, a large body of empirical studies, under cross-country and panel
data frameworks in particular, have revealed a signicant and positive eect of
nancial development on long-run economic growth.
However, considering the frequent incidences of excessive speculation and -
nancial crises, scepticism arises as to the hypothesized benets of deeper nancial
development. At the theoretical level, an over-sized nancial system could result
in the excessive speculative activities, nancial resource misallocation and eco-
nomic instability. (Cahuc and Challe, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Arcand et al., 2015;
Cournede and Denk, 2015) Meanwhile, the excessive over-leveraged investment of
the nancial sector during the economic expansion period could lead to nancial
instability, nancial crises and economic recession. (Minsky, 1982, 1991; Law and
Singh, 2014; Cournede and Denk, 2015) Also, as witnessed in the recent 2007-
2008 nancial crisis, a large and complicated nancial sector is likely to alter the
managerial incentives and could eventually end up in a \catastrophic meltdown" in
the nancial system due to the changes in the nature of risks undertaken. (Rajan,
2006) Meanwhile, a strand of empirical evidence over the last decade has revealed
a negative, or a potential non-linear, link between nance and economic perfor-
mance, challenging the expected growth-enhancing role of nancial development.
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Given the ongoing controversies on the nance-growth nexus, this thesis has
provided three chapters of empirical investigation, including both individual coun-
try and panel studies, on the link between nance and output performance. Typ-
ically, the employment of a wide range of sophisticated time series techniques and
recently developed panel data methods has important contribution to make to the
debate.
Chapter 2 investigated the nance-growth nexus in China. As the current
largest developing country in the world, China has experienced a phenomenal rate
of economic growth accompanied by a rapid expansion of the nancial sector.
By using various time series methods, including Johansen maximum likelihood
and the Pesaran autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration and causal-
ity approaches, a negative eect of China's domestic nancial development on its
long-term output performance is identied over the period 1952 to 2010. Also,
a bi-directional Granger causality was found between the China's economic per-
formance and the country's nancial development in this chapter. Collectively, it
indicates that China's nancial sector failed to promote the nation's economic per-
formance in the long run. Typically, this failure of Chinese nancial sector in the
fulllment of its growth-enhancing role is largely due to the issues of government
major ownership and the high volume of non-performing loans in the domestic
nancial system.
Frequently regarded as absent in China, the inuence of democracy on eco-
nomic performance has been on the recent agenda of growth economics. Chapter
3 of this thesis then investigates the role of democracy in the nance-growth nexus.
A panel of 171 economies over the period from 1960 to 2014 was constructed to
examine whether democracy had an impact on the expected benets of nancial
development worldwide. Diverse democracy measures and nancial development
indicators were employed in this study. Meanwhile, the estimation strategy in-
volved various dynamic panel estimation approaches; such as the rst-dierence
and system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. In general, the
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baseline results suggested a positive and signicant eect of nancial development
on long-term output growth. Also, limited evidence of a signicant eect of democ-
racy or its interaction with nancial development was observed. As a result, this
chapter conjectures that the benecial eect of nancial development does not re-
quire the condition of democracy. Financial development per se has the capacity
of promoting long-term economic performance.
Given the technical concerns over the standard dynamic panel estimation used
in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 of this thesis provided a re-examination of the nance-
growth nexus by applying the recently developed panel estimation methods. With
a balanced panel of 67 economies over the period from 1971 to 2007, issues of cross-
country heterogeneity and error cross-section dependence were overcome via ap-
plying the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and cross-sectionally augmented
autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) models. By and large, a positive and
signicant eect of nancial development on the long-term output performance
was found in this chapter. Some evidence of a nonlinear relationship between
nance and output performance was also observed. In addition, after dividing
the whole sample into two, the benecial long-run eect of nancial development
was only observed for the 29 non-democratic countries. For the other democratic
economies, however, such an eect is insignicant.
Overall, the weight of the empirical evidence shown in this thesis is in favour
of a positive link between nancial system and long-term output performance.
At the same time, based on the results presented, democracy is not conrmed as
a condition for the fulllment of the expected growth-enhancing role of nance.
In particular, these ndings are robust to a variety of specic econometric issues,
including data averaging, endogeneity, instrument proliferation, cross-country het-
erogeneity and error cross-section dependence.
Also, the concerns over the inuence of the recent 2007-2008 global nancial
crisis on the nance-growth nexus have been addressed in a variety of ways in this
thesis. To be specic, with the implementations of various scal and monetary
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stimulus programs, China has been listed as one of the rst few economies that
has weathered the crisis. Typically, Chinese economy still enjoys an annual GDP
growth rate of 7%, which is higher than that in the US or Japan, in the post crisis
period. (He and Sim, 2015) As a result, we did not choose to impose the nancial
crisis as an exogenous break point for the nancial development or the output level
series in Chapter 2. Instead, we used the endogenous breaks detected by Zivot-
Andrews (1992) test in the cointegration analyses in this chapter. In Chapter 2,
data averaging over ve-year intervals was applied. Given the global nancial crisis
happened in the last ve-year period in our sample, uctuations caused by this
crisis in dependent variable and regressors are likely to be smoothed out during
the data averaging process. In the third chapter, the inuence of nancial crisis
was regarded as a part of common shocks and cross-country correlations. Such an
impact is later controlled for using the CS-ARDL models in the estimation.
Noticeably, despite the overall positive ndings in this thesis, the hypothe-
sized benet of nance was not found to universally apply. In Chapter 2, the link
between nancial development and output performance in China is essentially a
counterexample to the positive relationship generally observed in the literature on
nance and growth. Therefore, this thesis calls for the recognitions of the impor-
tance and necessity of nancial sector reforms in order to fulll the nance's growth
enhancing role. In general, the ongoing reforms on the domestic nancial sector
in China should continue to be pushed forward. At the same time, eectiveness of
such reforms should be carefully evaluated. Typically, some micro-level evidence
has indicated the ownership reforms, such as, foreign acquisition and public list-
ing, did not contribute to the improvement of bank eciency and protability in
China. (Lin and Zhang, 2009) In this sense, the \growth diagnostics" approach
of Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2008) should be highlighted in the set-up of
further nancial reforms. For policy makers, instead of implementing the all-round
but not well-focused reforms, eorts should be made in the identication of the
most binding constraints in the domestic nancial system, in the sense that their
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removal would have the greatest impact on the long-term economic performance.
(Hausmann et al., 2008; Rodrik, 2008)
Of course, several avenues can be explored in the future to modify the empirical
investigations presented here. The rst is the measure of nancial development.
Apparently, the ratio of private credit of nancial intermediaries as a proportion
over GDP is the most appropriate indicator available for nancial development as
suggested by various existing nance-growth empirics. (Beck and Levine, 2004;
Beck et al., 2010) However, this indicator is essentially a measure of the size of
nancial system rather than the quality of the nancial intermediation. Also,
this nancial development indicator only emphasises the level of nancial insti-
tution development. Nevertheless, the usage of this measure basically overlooks
the development of nancial markets, the role of which is frequently considered as
indispensable, especially for the nancial system in developed economies. Indeed,
alternative nancial development indicators, including commercial bank accounts
per thousand adults, net interest margin, and the volatility of stock price index,
have been proposed in the literature. Such indicators go some way to quantifying
the not only size but individual access, eciency and stability of both nancial
institutions and nancial markets. (Beck et al., 2010; Cihak et al., 2013) However,
these measures can only be traced back to the late 1980s or early 1990s and hence
were not suitable for this study.
The second is the index of democracy. Various standard and newly-proposed
democracy indicators, have been applied in this thesis. However, continuous
democracy measures, the Polity2 score for instance, have been commonly criti-
cised for error fraught measurement and subjectivity in terms of assessment rules
and conceptual logic. (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Cheibub et al., 2010) Further-
more, the usage of a democracy index in binary form is doubtful given its inability
to accurately portray the nuances of democracy in individual nations. (Jacob and
Osang, 2015) Following such ideas, the criteria set in the partition of democratic
and non-democratic sub-samples in Chapter 4 could also be conceptually oversim-
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plied. Overall, questions still remain on the construction and accuracy of dierent
democracy indices.
The third is the potential technical pitfalls. In Chapter 2, estimation of the
eect on China's economic performance of the country's nancial development
is conducted under the multivariate VAR or VECM framework. However, due
to the data constraints, concerns over the potential mis-specication may arise
in this country-specic study. Meanwhile, following the liberal rule of Roodman
(2009a, b), Chapter 3 confronts the issue of \too many instruments" via restricting
number of instruments less than the number of countries in the GMM estimation.
However, considering a consensus is never reached on the most ideal instrument
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